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WTO AGRICULTURAL TRADE AND THE
UNFULFILLED PROMISE OF
DEVELOPMENT
Dr. Destaw A. Yigzaw*
ABSTRACT
The World Trade Organization (WTO) was established with an
alluring promise of enhancing the living standards of people around
the world, creating jobs and spurring development, while ensuring
equitable distribution of the fruits of trade, with particular regard to
the needs of the poor. However, critics see the WTO as a
mercantilist system tailored to the commercial interests of wealthy
nations and their corporations, with little or no attention to the
interests of the poor. What happens to agriculture affects the poor
disproportionately. If spurring economic development and thereby
enhancing the living standards of people is indeed the WTO’s goal,
no sector seems more significant to the accomplishment of that
mission than agriculture. Hence, probing the fairness of agricultural
trade provides a special insight with which to judge whether the
WTO is true to its word, and conversely, to evaluate the validity of
criticism directed against the trading regime. That is the aim of this
article. It examines the WTO agricultural trade regime and
concludes that the fact that agricultural trade remains the most
protected and distorted sector, despite its unrivalled significance to
development, is hardly a characteristic of a pro-development trading
system.

I. INTRODUCTION
Despite the WTO’s promise of increasing the standard of
living of people across the globe through the creation of jobs while
keeping a focus on the needs of the poor,1 it is commonly accused of
destroying jobs, shattering livelihoods, and generally being anti*

LL.M. (Stanford Law School), J.D. (Ghent University).
See Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization,
Apr. 15, 1994, 1867 U.N.T.S. 154, 33 I.L.M. 1144 [hereinafter Marrakesh
Agreement].
1
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poor. 2 Accusations against the trading regime are diverse and
multifaceted. Broadly, they may be summarized into two categories.
At the interstate level, critics maintain that the WTO system is
tailored to the interests of industrialized nations who have designed
the institution and negotiated its rules.3 As such, it is often argued
that while trade of industrial products (for which industrialized
nations have comparative advantage) has been remarkably liberalized,
agricultural trade, which is of greater interest to developing countries,
is still saddled with protectionism.4 At best, the argument goes, that
the system has failed to address the development aspirations of poor
nations and thus the alleviation of human suffering associated with
economic deprivation. At worst, it ensures the perpetuation of the
North’s hegemony in global trade.5 One may add that when that
hegemony is challenged by the emergence of new powers, the WTO
became unable to muster agreement or enthusiasm, as the current
Doha Round stalemate and concurrent shift of focus towards regional
trade agreement suggest.6
Within nations, the WTO is seen by many as “a symbol of
mercantilism, capitalism, the tool through which powerful
multinational corporations impose their law over human beings,
impairing their social, economic[,] and cultural rights.”7 Although
2
See Special Rapporteurs on Globalization and Human Rights, The
Realization of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Comm’n on Human
Rights, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/2000/13 (June 15, 2000) (by Joe OlokaOnyango and Deepika Udagama).
3
See, e.g., MARC PILISUK & JENNIFER ACHORD ROUNTREE, WHO
BENEFITS FROM GLOBAL VIOLENCE AND WAR: UNCOVERING A DESTRUCTIVE
SYSTEM 122–23 (2008).
4
See JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ & ANDREW CHARLTON, FAIR TRADE FOR ALL
44 (2006). As a matter of fact, global average tariff on merchandise trade
has been slashed from 40% to just below 4% during the GATT era. By
contrast, agriculture witnessed a reverse trend. See MELAKU GEBOYE DESTA,
THE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE IN AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTS 7
(2002).
5
See generally Sungjoon Cho, The Demise of Development in the Doha
Round Negotiations, 45 TEX. INT'L L.J. 573 (2010).
6
See Craig VanGrasstek, Speaking Truth about Power: The Real
Problem in the Multilateral Trading System, in BUILDING ON BALI: A WORK
PROGRAMME FOR THE WTO 59, 61 (Simon J. Evenett & Alejandro Jara eds.,
2013).
7
Pascal Lamy, Dir.-Gen., WTO, Towards Shared Responsibility and
Greater Coherence: Human Rights, Trade and Macroeconomic Policy,
Address at the Colloquium on Human Rights in the Global Economy (Jan.
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the WTO’s raison d'être lies in the enhancement of economic welfare
for all, many believe that trade rules are actually tailored to the
interests of powerful corporations that wield strong lobbying power.8
It is argued that at the WTO, governments essentially represent the
interests of their respective commercial communities, while the poor
have neither standing nor representation.9
What happens to agriculture affects the poor
disproportionately. Around 75% of the world’s poor depend on
agriculture as a source of income and livelihood.10 Agriculture is
also critical to the urban poor and non-farm households who spend
up to 80% of their incomes on food.11 In other words, agricultural

13, 2010) (transcript available at
https://www.wto.org/english/news_e/sppl_e/sppl146_e.htm). The WTO
dismisses such accusations as regrettable misconceptions about the trading
regime. See, e.g., WTO, 10 COMMON MISUNDERSTANDINGS ABOUT THE
WTO (1999), available at
www.depts.washington.edu/wtohist/documents/WTOmisunderstandings.pdf.
8
See Kishore Gawande, The Structure of Lobbying and Protection in
U.S. Agriculture 41 (World Bank Policy Research, Working Paper No. 3722,
2005).
9
For example, despite the obvious interactions between trade and
various human rights issues, no UN human rights institution or specialized
agency (such as the International Labor Organization) or any other human
rights body has observer status at the WTO. See SARAH JOSEPH, BLAME IT
ON THE WTO?: A HUMAN RIGHTS CRITIQUE 66 (2011). On the other hand,
the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, and similar institutions
have observer status at almost every single Council (including the General
Council), Committee, or Working Group. International Intergovernmental
Organizations Granted Observer Status to WTO Bodies, WTO,
https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/igo_obs_e.htm (last visited June 14,
2015).
10
See WORLD BANK, WORLD DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2008:
AGRICULTURE FOR DEVELOPMENT 45 (2007). Poverty is largely a rural
phenomenon. Three in every four of the 1.4 billion people who live in
extreme poverty, i.e., surviving on less than $1.25 a day (the main poverty
line at 2005 prices), live in rural areas. Poverty Headcount Ratio at $1.25 a
Day
(PPP)
(%
of
Population),
WORLD
BANK,
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SI.POV.DDAY (last visited June 14,
2015).
11
See Alex F. McCalla & John Nash, Agricultural Trade Reform and
Developing Countries, in REFORMING AGRICULTURAL TRADE FOR
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 2 (Alex F. McCalla & John Nash eds., 2007);
Jonathan Brooks, Agricultural Trade Reform, Adjustment and Poverty:
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trade has a more pronounced distributional effect than trade in any
other sector.12 Recognition of this enormous distributional effect is
the point of departure for our diagnosis of the role of agricultural
trade in development. Likewise, agriculture’s economic significance
for poor nations is remarkably higher.13 Agriculture is often a poor
nation’s biggest employer; largest source of gross domestic product
(GDP), export earnings, and tax revenues; and generally, the primary
engine of economic growth. 14 In 2009, for example, agriculture
accounted for 58% of the GDP of Sierra Leone and employed over
two-thirds of the work force.15 By contrast, for industrialized nations
such as the U.S., Japan, Germany, the UK, Switzerland, and Belgium,
agriculture accounted for no more than 1% of the GDP and employed
less than 4% of the work force.16
Agricultural trade policy reform is estimated to generate up
to 70% of the global gains from merchandize trade reform. 17
Conversely, although agricultural trade accounts for just 8% of the
global merchandize trade, it is responsible for approximately three-

Mapping the Linkages, in ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV. [OECD],
AGRICULTURAL TRADE AND POVERTY 9 (2003).
12
In 2010 alone, for example, hikes in food prices have plunged around
44 million more people into extreme poverty. Food Price Watch, WORLD
BANK, (Poverty Reduction and Equity Group at the World Bank,
Washington, D.C.) Feb. 2011, at 1. Meanwhile, the number of millionaires
continued to grow. See Robert Frank, Millionaire Population Bounces Back
to Pre-Crisis Peak, WALL ST. J. (June 10, 2010, 12:01 PM),
http://blogs.wsj.com/wealth/2010/06/10/millionaire-population-bouncesback-to-pre-crisis-peak.
13
See Patrick A. Messerlin, Reforming Agricultural Policies in the
Doha Round, in ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AND MULTILATERAL TRADE
COOPERATION 3 (Simon J. Evenett & Bernard M. Hoekman eds., 2006).
14
In least-developed countries, agriculture on average accounts for 40%
of GDP, 35% of export, and employs up to 70% of the workforce. See id.
15
See Agriculture, Value Added (% of GDP), WORLD BANK,
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NV.AGR.TOTL.ZS (last visited June 14,
2015).
16
See id.
17
See Dominique van der Mensbrugghe & John C. Beghin, Global
Agricultural Reform: What is at Stake?, in GLOBAL AGRICULTURAL TRADE
AND DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 115 (M. Ataman Aksoy & John C. Beghin eds.,
2005).
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fifths of the global gain forgone due to trade distortions.18 GDP
growth generated by agriculture is up to four times more effective in
alleviating poverty than growth generated by other sectors. 19
Although industrialized nations dominate agricultural trade, 20
developing countries’ agriculture accounts for two-thirds of the
world’s agricultural value–added. 21 Therefore, the case for
overhauling agricultural trade is compelling. Agriculture represents
the ultimate test of the development promise of the WTO. In fact, if
spurring economic development and thereby raising the standards of
living of people is the WTO’s mission, no sector seems to have
greater significance to the accomplishment of that mission than
agriculture. Therefore, probing the fairness of agricultural trade
provides a unique vantage point with which to evaluate the
credibility of the trading regime.
By demonstrating how gross distortions in agricultural trade
inhibit the development aspirations of the world’s poor, this article
argues that the WTO’s ostensible goals have little relevance to the
institution’s modus operandi. It maintains that the fact that
agriculture remains the most protected and distorted sector, despite
its unparalleled significance to development, hardly bears out the
declaration that raising standards of living is the WTO’s goal.22 Part
II details the reasons and motives for agricultural protectionism. Part
III analyzes the Agreement on Agriculture (AoA) and explains how
existing rules undermine rather than spur development. It also
18
Kym Anderson & Will Martin, Agriculture, Trade Reform, and the
Doha Agenda 12–13 (World Bank Policy Research, Working Paper No.
3607, 2005).
19
See WORLD BANK, WORLD DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2008:
AGRICULTURE FOR DEVELOPMENT, supra note 10, at 6.
20
“OECD countries dominate world trade in agriculture - with over
70% of exports and 75% of imports; least developed countries account for
only about 1% of world agricultural imports and exports.” The Doha
Development Round of Trade Negotiations: Understanding the Issues,
OECD,http://www.oecd.org/agriculture/thedohad
evelopmentroundoftradenegotiationsunderstandingtheissues.htm (last visited
June 14, 2015).
21
WORLD BANK, WORLD DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2008: AGRICULTURE
FOR DEVELOPMENT, supra note 10, at 3.
22
Agriculture is the most protected and distorted sector. See KYM
ANDERSON, U.N. CONF. ON TRADE & DEV., AGRICULTURE, TRADE REFORM
AND POVERTY REDUCTION: IMPLICATIONS FOR SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA, at 1,
U.N. Sales No. E.04.II.D.5 (2004).
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elucidates why agricultural protectionism continues to derail Doha
Round negotiations, seriously undermining the WTO’s credibility in
the process. It is argued here that addressing longstanding issues of
agricultural trade is not only an imperative for the completion of the
Doha Round but also represents a credibility test for the trading
regime.

II. AGRICULTURE: A SUI GENERIS?
Agriculture is heretical to the gospel of free trade. The roots
of agricultural protectionism can be traced back to classical
antiquity.23 Since the medieval times, agricultural protectionism has
always been an “institutional norm.” 24 Those who strenuously
proclaim the virtues of free trade have always found ways to make an
exception for agriculture.25 Even in the heydays of the free trade
doctrine, as in late eighteenth century Britain, agriculture was
protected with export subsidies and prohibitive import duties. 26
Adam Smith observed:
The law of England . . . favors agriculture not only
indirectly by the protection of commerce, but by
several direct encouragements. Except in times of
scarcity, the exportation of corn is not only free,
but encouraged by bounty. In times of moderate
plenty, the importation of foreign corn is loaded
23

In ancient Greece, for example, grain trade was subject to stricter
laws than trade in other commodities, and a serious mistake on the part of
supervisory officials was punishable by death. See P. Spitz, The Right to
Food for Peoples and for the People: A Historical Perspective, in THE RIGHT
TO FOOD 169, 173–74 (P. Alston & K. Tomaševski eds., 1984).
24
See Ken A. Ingersent & A. J. Rayner, Agricultural Policy in Western
Europe and the United States, 83 AM. J. AGRIC. ECON. 788 (1999).
Agricultural protectionism has likewise been the federal government’s policy
in the USA ever since the country’s foundation. See Cody A. Thacker,
Agricultural Trade Liberalization in the Doha Round: The Search for a
Modalities Draft, 33 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 721, 723 (2005).
25
See Kym Anderson, Five Decades of Distortion to Agricultural
Incentives 3 (World Bank Agricultural Distortions Working Paper No. 76,
2009).
26
See generally ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND
CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF NATIONS 393–94 (Edwin Cannan ed., Univ. of
Chicago Press 1977) (1776).
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with duties that amount to a prohibition. The
importation of live cattle . . . is prohibited at all
times . . . . Those that cultivate land, therefore,
have monopoly against their countrymen for the
two greatest and most important articles of land
produce, bread and butcher’s meat.27
Likewise, the reinvigoration of free trade after World War II largely
bypassed agriculture.
Pre-Uruguay Round attempts to bring
agriculture into the mainstream General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade (GATT) discipline proved unsuccessful.28 Plausibly dubbed
“the deal-maker or breaker,” agriculture continues to determine the
pace and progress of multilateral trade negotiations. It was
responsible for the unprecedented protraction of the Uruguay
Round.29 It also contributed to the failures of the WTO Ministerial
Conference of 1999 in Seattle.30 Once again, it has emerged as the
major obstacle in the current Doha Round, and is blamed for the
collapse of numerous initiatives over the last fourteen years.31 While
the recent deal at the ninth WTO Ministerial Conference has been
widely hailed, there is nothing in the deal that shows progress
towards agricultural trade liberalization.32
Despite its unique potential for poverty alleviation, WTO
members, rich and poor, remain stubbornly reluctant to open up their
agriculture to global competition. 33 This appears paradoxical
because, from an economic point of view, agriculture is no longer the
sector it once was. While it remains the backbone of many poor
27

Id.
See JOHN H. JACKSON, THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM: LAW AND
POLICY OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 314 (2nd ed. 1997).
29
At the Uruguay Round, negotiations “proceeded at a pace only to the
extent it was permitted by the U.S. and the EC negotiators who were locked
in a very intense political struggle over the issue of agriculture.” Id.
30
Agriculture is also a major source of trade dispute. See DESTA, supra
note 4, at 7.
31
See, e.g.,, Tim Josling, An Overview of the WTO Agricultural
Negotiations, in REFORMING AGRICULTURAL TRADE FOR DEVELOPING
COUNTRIES 62 (Alex F. McCalla & John Nash eds., 2007).
32
See generally Melaku Geboye Desta, The WTO Negotiations on
Agriculture: What Next After Bali?, in BUILDING ON BALI, supra note 6, at
111.
33
See generally Tim Josling, A Post-Bali Agenda for Agriculture, in
BUILDING ON BALI, supra note 6, at 105.
28
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economies, the sector’s contribution to industrialized nations’
economies has declined remarkably.34 The commercial significance
of agriculture has likewise shrunk; its share in the global
merchandize trade has dropped from over 40% in 1950 to less than
10% in 1999.35 Yet governments seem to believe that agriculture is
somehow special. The WTO Committee on Agriculture concluded,
“[s]pecific characteristics of agriculture need continued separate
treatment within WTO.”36 The vexing question is this: why are states
unwilling to place faith in the market when it comes to agriculture?
The explanation lies in two related reasons: one epitomizes the clash
between trade and nontrade concerns, while the other represents the
conflict of interests between industrialized nations and their
developing counterparts.
First, agriculture is so distinctively multifunctional that
comparative advantage arguments must be treated with great caution.
Food security lies at the heart of agriculture’s multifunctionality.
Food, which makes up approximately 80% of agricultural trade, is
simply too essential to let the market dictate outcomes.37 Agriculture
is also vital for development, employment, rural amenity,
biodiversity, landscape, and environmental sustainability, in addition
to its sensitivity in domestic politics. Second, developing countries
have a disproportionately higher stake in agriculture. As the lifeline
of many developing countries’ economies, a fair agricultural trade
34

See, e.g., Agriculture, Value Added (% of GDP), supra note 15.
See WTO, WORLD TRADE REPORT 2008: TRADE IN A GLOBALIZING
WORLD 17 (2008). It should be noted, however, that the decline in the
relative share is mostly due to the dramatic rise of trade in manufactured
products. Otherwise, global agricultural exports have nearly tripled over the
last two decades. See Farm Trade Rises Amid Continuing Concern,
Committee Hears, WTO (Nov. 19 2009),
http://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news09_e/ag_com_19nov09_e.htm.
36
In 2000, a group of thirty-eight WTO members submitted a “Note on
Non-trade Concerns” to the WTO Committee on Agriculture. Fourth Special
Session of the Committee on Agriculture, Statement by Australia: Non-Trade
Concerns, ¶ 28, G/AG/NG/W/59 (Nov. 29, 2000). In their notes, they
emphasized that “food is the most essential good,” that it needs to be treated
differently, and that “every country has the right” to take necessary measures
to ensure food security and other non-trade concerns. Id. Accordingly, the
Committee concluded that agriculture’s unique characteristics warrant the
decision to continue treating the sector differently. Id.
37
See Agriculture: Explanation, WTO,
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/agric_e/ag_intro01_intro_e.htm (last
visited June 14, 2015).
35
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epitomizes their longstanding quest for a pro-development trade
structure. 38 Agriculture is thus the litmus test of the promises of the
“Development Round.”39 Developing countries feel disadvantaged
by past agreements and thus seek meaningful liberalization in
agriculture, a sector many of them regard as their niche.40 They want
industrialized nations to cut their massive agricultural support and
prohibitive tariffs.41 Thus far, rich nations have been unwilling to do
so. 42 They demand that developing countries reciprocate by
dismantling their own farm protection, including measures that are
meant to safeguard food security.43 Before turning to these issues, a
few words on the concept and scope of agricultural products are in
order.
A. AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTS
The GATT never had a definition for agricultural products.
The evolution of the concept is rather perplexing. Agricultural trade
differs from trade in other products due to its historical exemption
from the GATT disciplines on quantitative restrictions and export

38

See generally Merlinda D. Ingco & John D. Nash, What’s at Stake?
Developing-country Interests in the Doha Development Round, in
AGRICULTURE AND THE WTO: CREATING A TRADING SYSTEM FOR
DEVELOPMENT 3 (Merlinda D. Incgo & John D. Nash eds., 2004).
39
Ostensibly, the development needs of poor member states lies at the
heart of the Doha Round. See WTO, Ministerial Declaration of 20
November 2001, ¶ 2, WT/MIN(01)/DEC/1 (Nov. 20, 2001) [hereinafter
Doha Declaration].
40
Although the majority of WTO members are developing countries,
substantive agreements were traditionally negotiated between few
protagonists, while developing countries campaigned for preferential
treatment, thereby undermining their bargaining power. See STIGLITZ &
CHARLTON, supra note 4, at 42–43.
41
Food prices measured at the farm gate in OECD countries are 30%
higher than in international markets, making it impenetrable for exporters
from developing countries. Farmers in OECD countries receive annual
government support of around $280 billion (mostly on dairy, cotton, and
rice), which is more than three times the amount of official development
assistance from OECD countries to developing countries. See The Doha
Development Round of Trade Negotiations, supra note 20.
42
See Ingco & Nash, supra note 38, at 39.
43
See id.
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subsidies.44 The meaning of the term agricultural products may thus
be gleaned in these areas. Yet, the concept does not figure uniformly
in the two.
For the purpose of subsidies, until the Tokyo Round,
agricultural products were lumped under the rubric of “primary
products.”45 The 1955 Review Session amendments to the GATT
distinguished between “primary” and “non-primary” products.46 A
primary product was thus defined as “any product of farm, forest or
fishery, or any mineral, in its natural form or which has undergone
such processing as is customarily required to prepare it for marketing
in substantial volume in international trade.”47 This definition was
transplanted almost verbatim from the Havana Charter. 48 The
Agreement on Interpretation and Application of Articles VI, XVI,
and XXIII of the GATT (Subsidies Code), a result of the Tokyo
Round negotiations, distinguished between “certain primary
products” and other products.49 Agricultural products in the Code’s
language were generally subsumed under certain primary products

44

See R. Sharma, Agriculture in the GATT: A Historical Account, FOOD
& AGRIC. ORG., http://www.fao.org/docrep/003/x7352e/x7352e04.htm (last
visited June 14,, 2015).
45
Kevin C. Kennedy, Reforming Farm Trade in the Next Round of
WTO Multilateral Trade Negotiations, 35 J. WORLD TRADE 1061, 1064
(2001).
46
See JACKSON, supra note 29, at 190.
47
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Annex I, ad art. XVI, Oct.
30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-11, 55 U.N.T.S. 194 [hereinafter GATT].
48
See United Nations Conference on Trade and Employment, Havana,
Cuba, Nov. 21, 1947–Mar. 24, 1948, Havana Charter for an International
Trade Organization, U.N. Doc. E/CONF.2/78, art. 56 (Mar. 4, 1948)
[hereinafter Havana Charter].
49
Agreement on the Interpretation and Application of Articles VI, XVI
and XXIII of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, April 12, 1979,
31 U.S.T. 513, T.I.A.S. No. 9619, reprinted in GATT B.I.S.D. (26th Supp.)
at 64 (Article 9 of the Interpretation Agreement states, “signatories shall not
grant export subsidies on products other than certain primary products.”).
The term “certain primarily products” embraces “any product of farm, forest
or fishery, or any mineral, in its natural form or which has undergone such
processing as is customarily required to prepare it for marketing in
substantial volume in international trade.” ANALYTICAL INDEX OF THE GATT,
ARTICLE XVI – SUBSIDIES 455, available at
www.wto.org/english/res_e/booksp_e/gatt_ai_e/art16_e.pdf.
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until the Uruguay Round.50 Yet, what precisely constitutes a primary
product was not always unequivocal. For example, in the EC Wheat
Flour case, whether or not wheat flour was a primary product was in
contention.51
However, for the purpose of quantitative restrictions the
exception under GATT Article XI applies only to “agricultural or
fishery products.” 52 Apart from that, we do not find the term
agricultural product defined under the GATT.53 Confronted with
definitional problems, the GATT panel in Japan-Agriculture held
that from the long-standing practice of the GATT, products falling
under chapters one to twenty-four of the Customs Cooperation
Council Nomenclature (CCCN) could, in principle, be regarded as
agricultural products.54 The first twenty-four chapters of the CCCN
list included fisheries, and thus, the panel’s interpretation is
consistent with the meaning of Article XI.55

50

Andrew Stoler, The Evolution of Subsidies Disciplines in GATT and
the WTO, 44 J. WORLD TRADE 797, 804 n.12 (2010).
51
See Report of the Panel, European Economic Community–Subsidy on
Export of Wheat Flour, ¶ 2.3 SCM/42 (Mar. 21, 1983) (unadopted).
52
GATT, supra note 47, art. XI, ¶ 2(c).
53
See id. Annex I’s Notes and Supplementary Provisions state that the
“term primary products” includes agricultural products. See id. at Annex I,
ad art. XXXVI, para. 4.
54
Report of the Panel, Japan–Restrictions on Imports of Certain
Agricultural Products, ¶ 5.1.3.2. L/6253-35S/163 (Feb. 2, 1988).
55
See id.; GATT, supra note 47, art. XI, ¶ 2(c). The CCCN evolved
from the Geneva Nomenclature, which came into existence in 1937 as a
Draft Customs Nomenclature of the League of Nations. It was replaced by
Brussels Tariff Nomenclature (BTN) in 1959, renamed as CCCN in 1974,
and was replaced by the Harmonized System (HS) in 1988. The first twentyfour chapters of the HS Nomenclature edition (2002) covers, inter alia, live
animals and animal products; fisheries products; products of animal origin
not elsewhere specified or included; vegetable products (including live trees
and other plants, bulbs and roots); fruits and nuts; coffee, tea, and spices;
cereals and cereal preparations (such as flour and pastrycooks); products of
the milling industry (such as starches, oil seeds and miscellaneous grains);
seeds; industrial or medicinal plants; straw and fodder; lac, gums and other
extracts; sugar products; cocoa products; tobacco products, and beverages.
Harmonized System Nomenclature 2002 edition, WORLD CUSTOMS ORG.,
http://www.wcoomd.org/en/topics/nomenclature/instrument-andtools/hs_nomenclature_older_edition/hs_nomenclature_table_2002.aspx (last
visited June 14, 2015).
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The AoA makes a departure from the GATT tradition by not
covering fishery products. 56 Thus, cases like Tuna-Dolphin and
others cannot arise in the framework of the AoA. By contrast, some
other (mostly non-food) products have been added to the HS list
mentioned above.57 In sum, the scope of agriculture products is not
limited to crops, livestock, and livestock products.58 While food
products dominate agricultural trade, not all food products are
agricultural products nor vice versa.59
B. MULTIFUNCTIONALITY OF AGRICULTURE
Agriculture has always had multiple functions. However,
the term multifunctionality cut into agricultural policy discourse only
recently. The Rio Earth Summit of 1992 (Summit) was the first
international forum that recognized the multifunctionality of
agriculture.60 The Summit concluded by declaring that agricultural
policies should be reviewed “in the light of the multifunctional aspect
of agriculture, particularly with regard to food security and
sustainable development.”61 There has been a significant debate on

56
See Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade
Organization, Agreement on Agriculture, Annex 1A, Apr. 15, 1994, 1867
U.N.T.S. 4 [hereinafter AoA].
57
See id. The new additions include mannitol, sorbitol, essential oils,
hides and skins, silk products, wool and fur products, cotton, and others.
Generally, not only primary products (e.g., food grain, livestock, livestock
products) but also processed products (chocolates, beverages, tobacco
products), as well as fibers (cotton) and raw materials (animal skins) are
covered. Id.
58
See id.; Japan–Restrictions on Imports of Certain Agricultural
Products, supra note 54.
59
Thus, it is important to distinguish the two so that protectionist
measures, justified on the ground of food security, may not affect trade in
nonfood agricultural products. Id.
60
See G.A. WILSON, MULTIFUNCTIONAL AGRICULTURE: A TRANSITION
THEORY PERSPECTIVE 183 (2007).
61
United Nations Conference on Environment and Development; Rio
de Janeiro, Braz., June 3–14, 1992, Agenda 21, U.N. Doc.
A/CONF.151/26/Rev.1 (Vol. I), Annex 2 (Aug. 12, 1992). See generally
Teunis van Rheenen & Tewodaj Mengistu, Rural Areas in Transition: A
Developing World Perspective, in MULTIFUNCTIONAL RURAL LAND
MANAGEMENT: ECONOMICS AND POLICIES 326 (Floor Brouwer & C. Martijn
van der Heide eds., 2009).
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agriculture’s multifunctionality since the Summit.62 The debate is,
however, beset by conceptual obscurity and skepticism.
The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and
Development (OECD) has been a pioneer in providing a theoretical
framework for multifunctionality in agriculture and trying to map out
its relevance in the formulation of agricultural trade policy.63 The
OECD defines agricultural multifunctionality from an economic
perspective based on two key elements. First, “the existence of
multiple commodity and non-commodity outputs that are jointly
produced by agriculture.” Second, “the fact that some of the noncommodity outputs exhibit the characteristics of externalities or
public goods, with the result that markets for these goods do not exist
or function poorly.” 64 Therefore, according to the OECD, food,
fiber, and other raw materials are subsumed under “commodity
outputs,” whereas agriculture’s role in food security, employment,
environmental sustainability and recreational amenities, tradition,
rural landscape, biodiversity, and the like are classified as “noncommodity” outputs.65
However, many believe that treating food exclusively from
a commercial point of view poses a serious threat to “noncommodity” values of agriculture, including food security. 66
Speaking at an event marking the 16th World Food Day at the height
of the global food crisis, former U.S. President Bill Clinton stated
62

See generally Bruno Losch, Debating the Multifunctionality of
Agriculture: From Trade Negotiations to Development Policies by the South,
4 J. AGRARIAN CHANGE 336 (2004).
63
See LEO MAIER & MIKITARO SHOBAYASHI, OECD,
MULTIFUNCTIONALITY: TOWARDS AN ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK 5 (2001).
64
Id. at 13.
65
See OECD, MULTIFUNCTIONALITY: POLICY IMPLICATIONS 7–13
(2008). In earlier reports, the OECD categorized agricultural outputs into
“food” and “non-food” outputs, later switching to the terms “market” and
“non-market” goods, and finally settling on “commodity” and “noncommodity” output classifications. See MAIER & MIKITARO, supra note 63,
at 10.
66
Commodification of food is viewed as a theoretical paradigm that
underlies the unprecedented expansion of corporate farming, known for
heavy reliance on chemical use and agricultural biotechnology. This may be
antithetical to the sustainability not only of the environment, but also of longterm food security. See generally FRED MAGDOFF ET AL., HUNGRY FOR
PROFIT: THE AGRIBUSINESS THREAT TO FARMERS, FOOD, AND THE
ENVIRONMENT (2000) (providing a collection of essays regarding changes in
agriculture).
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that the world blundered (while negotiating trade agreements) by
treating food as a commodity rather than as a vital right of the poor,
and that contributed to the food crisis.67 That is, of course, without
forgetting that states have a legal obligation under international law
to respect and protect everyone’s right to adequate food. 68
Furthermore, treating food as a commodity and food security as one
of the many externalities of food production is problematic for
several reasons. First, food supply is the primary function of
agriculture.69 Unlike environmental sustainability or rural amenity,
food security is not something incidental to the process of
agricultural production. As such, putting food and food security into
separate categories of commodity and non-commodity functions is
unconvincing since agriculture’s primary function of food production
may not be cogently separated from its role in food security. Second,
unlike all other multifunctional outputs, food security is not a
nonfood value.70 Third, food security underlies most multifunctional
outputs of agriculture, from rural employment to environmental
sustainability and biodiversity.71 Fourth, whether food security may
be regarded as a public good is arguable.72 Finally, it may even be
67

See Bill Clinton: “We Blew It’’ On Global Food, CBS NEWS, Feb. 11,
2009, http://www.cbsnews.com/
stories/2008/10/23/world/main4542268.shtml.
68
For more on this, see generally Destaw A. Yigzaw, Hunger and the
Law: Freedom from Hunger as a Freestanding Right, 36 HOUS. J. INT’L L.
656 (2014) (arguing that the right to food embraces both the right to be free
from hunger and the right to adequate food, which should be treated distinct
from each other).
69
See Food & Agric. Org., The Energy and Agriculture Nexus:
Environment and Natural Resources (Env’t & Natural Res. Working Paper
No. 4, 2000), available at
http://www.fao.org/docrep/003/x8054e/x8054e07.htm.
70
See David Vanzetti & Els Wynen, The “Multifunctionality’’ of
Agriculture and Its Implications for Policy, in AGRICULTURE AND THE WTO:
CREATING A TRADING SYSTEM FOR DEVELOPMENT 174–75 (2004).
71
While some multifunctional outputs of agriculture have intangible
benefits, most are tied to food security, directly or otherwise. Even though
environmental sustainability is arguably the most crucial determinant of
future global food security, biodiversity is also pivotal for food security,
which is why “Biodiversity for Food Security” was the theme for the 2004
World Food Day. For more on this, see Marsha A. Echols, Focus on
Biodiversity for Food Diversity: Expressing the Value of Agrodiversity and
Its Know-How in International Sales, 48 HOW. L. J. 431 (2004).
72
See Vanzetti & Wynen, supra note 70, at 175.
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argued that food security is not a joint product of agricultural
production, as it can be ensured through international trade.73
Article 20 of the AoA explicitly mandates that food security
and other “non-trade concerns” shall be taken into account in further
agricultural negotiations. 74 This has also been reaffirmed by the
Doha Ministerial Declarations. 75 This seems to be a positive
response to those who accuse the WTO of coddling trade and
commercial interests at the expense of legitimate non-trade
concerns.76 However, harmonizing agricultural trade liberalization
with attending non-trade concerns has proved to be extraordinarily
difficult. Few dispute the multifunctionality of agriculture, 77 yet
there is skepticism that some WTO members invoke
multifunctionality disingenuously as covert protectionism.78 The fact
that most agricultural subsidies in OECD countries go to large-scale
farmers and corporate agribusinesses seem to bear out this
skepticism.79 Indeed, a closer scrutiny of the issue suggests that
disagreements on multifunctionality are often patterned along the
lines of the subjective comparative advantages of nations.
73

The pinnacle of comparative advantage theory, however ideal, is a
rule-based, predictable, and stable world, where each nation does what it is
capable of doing best, and relies on the international market to secure
everything else. Hence, theoretically, a nation could ensure its food security
without engaging in food production at all.
74
AoA, supra note 56, at 422–23.
75
See Doha Declaration, supra note 39, ¶ 13.
76
See James R. Simpson & Thomas J. Schoenbaum, Non-trade
Concerns in WTO Trade Negotiations: Legal and Legitimate Reasons for
Revising the “Box” System?, 2 INT’L J. AGRIC. RES., GOVERNANCE, &
ECOLOGY 399, 401–02 (2003).
77
In the WTO context, multifunctionality is understood as the “[i]dea
that agriculture has many functions in addition to producing food and fibre,
e.g. environmental protection, landscape preservation, rural employment,
food security, etc.” Glossary, WTO, http://www.wto.org/
english/thewto_e/glossary_e/
glossary_e.htm (last visited June 14, 2015).
78
See generally MARY BOHMAN ET AL., ECON. RESEARCH SERV., USDA,
THE USE AND ABUSE OF MULTIFUNCTIONALITY (1999).
79
A large portion of the massive agricultural subsidies in OECD
countries (90% in the case of the U.S.) goes to the richest 25% of farmers.
WORLD BANK, GLOBAL ECONOMIC PROSPECTS 2004: REALIZING THE
DEVELOPMENT PROMISE OF THE DOHA AGENDA 121 (2003). Thus, claims
about rural welfare, employment, environmental sustainability, and other
aspects of multifunctionality merit serious scrutiny.
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1. MULTIFUNCTIONALITY AND COMPARATIVE ADVANTAGE
Once a member country’s comparative advantage in
agriculture is known, it is easy to guess its position on the issue of
multifunctionality.
The so-called friends of multifunctionality
(including the EU, Japan, Mauritius, Norway, South Korea, and
Switzerland) argue that production-linked agricultural support is
essential to maintain positive externalities and public goods
associated with agricultural production.80 They believe that the Green
Box is insufficient and therefore advocate greater flexibility. These
high cost food producing countries also maintain a relatively high
level of amber box support relative to what is permitted under the
AoA. 81 On the other hand, WTO members that have a strong
comparative advantage in agriculture, particularly the U.S. and the
Cairns Group,82 believe that multifunctionality serves as a disguise
for protectionism.83 Certain aspects of multifunctionality, such as
cultural significance or rural landscape, are indeed difficult to
reasonably value and thus are susceptible to abuse. 84 Like
industrialized nations, developing countries’ positions on
multifunctionality are heterogeneous. Many developing countries,
80

See Jessrey M. Peterson et al., Multifunctionality and Optimal
Environmental Policies for Agriculture in an Open Economy, in
AGRICULTURE AND THE WTO: CREATING A TRADING SYSTEM FOR
DEVELOPMENT 165 (2004).
81
BOHMAN ET AL., supra note 78, at 6–7.
82
The Cairns Group is a group of agricultural exporting nations formed
in 1986 in Cairns, Australia. Its members are: Argentina, Australia, Bolivia,
Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Guatemala, Indonesia, Malaysia, New
Zealand, Pakistan, Paraguay, Peru, the Philippines, South Africa, Thailand,
and Uruguay. Since its formation, the group has lobbied for agricultural
trade liberalization, and represents probably the most influential block in
agricultural negotiations, other than the EU. THE CAIRNS GROUP,
http://www.cairnsgroup.org/Pages/default.aspx (last visited June 14, 2015).
83
Eugenio Diaz-Bonilla and Rashid S. Kaukab, Liberalizing
Agricultural Trade and Developing Countries, CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT FOR
INT’L
PEACE,
http://carnegieendowment.org/2003/03/03/liberalizingagricultural-trade-and-developing-countries.
84
See Janet Stephenson, The Cultural Values Model: An Intergrated
Approach to Values in Landscape, 84 LANDSCAPE & URBAN PLANNING 127,
127 (2009). The concern here is that WTO members may inflate the cultural
significance of crop production or other aesthetic values, such as rural
landscape, to justify their agricultural support.
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including members of the Cairns Group, are skeptical about
multifunctionality, which they consider as a form of “special and
differential treatment for rich countries.”85 However, these countries
are still keen on the issue of development. Many of them are also
cognizant of their vulnerabilities, especially regarding food security,
and thus cannot afford to object to multifunctionality altogether.86
2. FOOD SECURITY: THE CRUX OF MULTIFUNCTIONALITY
Multifunctionality may be used as a bandwagon to smuggle
various interests into the WTO. 87 Though it is true that
multifunctionality is not peculiar to agriculture, there are
characteristics that are unique to agriculture.88 Agriculture is the
source of 95% of the worldwide calorie intake (fishing and hunting
account for the remaining 5%).89 As such, agriculture is the bedrock
of human security,90 and a nation’s survival can even depend upon
access to food.91 Further, national security has historically been the
major justification for agricultural protectionism. 92 States still
consider food self-sufficiency as a core component of their national
security strategy.93 In his address to the Future Farmers of America,
85
Briefing Note Regarding Agricultural Issues Raised at the Seattle
Ministerial Conference, WTO, http://www.wto.org/english/
thewto_e/minist_e/min99_e/english/about_e/07ag_e.htm (last visited June
14, 2015).
86
The vulnerability of international trade to manipulation by powerful
nations and the “North-South duel” is quite evident in agriculture. However,
WTO members’ sector interests are too diverse to fit into “North-South”
categorization. For example, whereas the Cairns Group embraces both poor
and rich nations, both poor and developed nations are net food importing.
87
See Vanzetti & Wynen, supra note 70, at 170.
88
See OECD, supra note 65, at 10.
89
See Stefan Mann, Degrees of Jointness for Food Security and
Agriculture in Multifunctionality, in AGRICULTURE: EVALUATING THE
DEGREE OF JOINTNESS, POLICY IMPLICATIONS 159 (OECD 2008).
90
“There have always been two major components of human security:
freedom from fear and freedom from want.” U.N. DEV. PROGRAMME,
HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 24 (1994).
91
MICHAEL J. TREBILCOCK ET AL., THE REGULATION OF INTERNATIONAL
TRADE 440 (4th ed. 2013).
92
See PETER GOUREVITCH, POLITICS IN HARD TIMES: COMPARATIVE
RESPONSES TO INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC CRISES 46 (1986).
93
See, e.g., Aryn Baker, Desert Dreams: Can the Middle Eastern
Country of Qatar Learn to Feed Itself?, TIME (Nov. 19, 2012),
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former U.S. President George W. Bush remarked: “Can you imagine
a country that was unable to grow enough food to feed the people? It
would be a nation subject to international pressure. It would be a
nation at risk. And so when we’re talking about American agriculture,
we’re really talking about a national security issue.”94 With a touch
of hypocrisy, however, President Bush argued that American farmers
ought to feed the world:
I want America’s farmers and ranchers feeding
those who are hungry, those who need foodstuffs.
We’re the best in the world at growing . . . And,
therefore, we ought to work hard to open up all
avenues, all markets, so we can feed people. . . .
There was a big debate . . . as to whether or not
China ought to be allowed into what’s called [t]he
[WTO]. I argued vociferously that they should
be[.] . . . [B]y opening up Chinese markets to
American foodstuffs, it will be beneficial to
American farmers . . . we want to be feeding the
Chinese.95
The importance of food security in the controversy over
multifunctionality can be gleaned from two facts. 96 First, as
indicated above, while net food importing countries are keen about
http://science.time.com/2012/11/19/desert-dreams-can-the-middle-easterncountry-of-qatar-learn-to-feed-itself/ (“[A] homegrown meal is not only
possible, but essential for the Mideast country’s national security.”);
Jonathan Shrier, Food Security Contributes to National Security, U.S. DEPT.
OF STATE OFFICIAL BLOG (Oct. 28, 2011), http://blogs.state.gov/
stories/2011/10/28/food-security-contributes-national-security (“Investments
made to ward off food insecurity and prevent its recurrence can prevent the
vicious cycles of rising extremism, armed conflict, and state failure that can
require far larger commitments of resources down the road.”).
94
Press Release, Office of the Press Secretary, President’s Remarks to
the Future Farmers of America (July 27, 2001), available at
http://georgewbushwhitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2001/07/20010727-2.html.
95
Id.
96
Vanzetti & Wynen, supra note 70, at 169–70. Food security is
different, not only because it is the most crucial feature of multifunctionality,
but also because it underlies other aspects of multifunctionality, as discussed
above.
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multifunctionality, surplus producing countries are generally less
enthusiastic about it.97 Second, the credibility of concerns for many
other aspects of multifunctionality is suspect. This is particularly
true with respect to the aesthetic values of agriculture. For example,
even though most societies were once predominantly agrarian, there
is almost nothing particularly revealing about why agriculture is of
particular cultural significance for some countries but not for others.
Even the credibility of less controversial aspects of
multifunctionality, such as environmental sustainability and
biodiversity, must be subjected to scrutiny. While agriculture has a
unique potential in sustaining the environment, mainly through
preserving biodiversity, it also contributes to its destruction. 98
Beyond exhausting fertile soil and underground water, agriculture
contributes up to 30% of greenhouse gas emissions,99 making it the
second largest polluter. 100
Yet, countries that espouse
multifunctionality have not necessarily been keen in cutting
greenhouse gas emissions or the intensive use of chemicals in their
agricultural sectors. Nor are they necessarily sticking to traditional
methods of farming either.
Net food importing industrialized nations and developing
countries are particularly keen about food security.101 However, the
roots of their concern are different. Net food importing industrialized
countries are concerned about the supply side of the equation; their
concern is mainly associated with international market volatility and
export restrictions. 102 Accordingly, they advocate a strong WTO
discipline that helps ensure a stable food supply in the international
market by, inter alia, prohibiting export restrictions.103 In their joint
97

While food importing industrialized nations champion
multifunctionality, the U.S., the Cairns Groups, and many other developing
countries generally oppose it as a justification for domestic support. See
Vanzetti & Wynen, supra note 70, at 3.
98
See WORLD BANK, WORLD DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2008:
AGRICULTURE FOR DEVELOPMENT, supra note 10, at 4.
99
Id.
100
Carin Smaller & Sophia Murphy, Bridging the Divide: A Human
Rights Vision for Global Food Trade, in THE GLOBAL FOOD CHALLENGE:
TOWARDS A HUMAN RIGHTS APPROACH TO TRADE AND INVESTMENT POLICIES
112 (Sophia Murphy & Armin Paasch eds., 2009).
101
See id. at 9.
102
See WTO Comm. on Agric., Food Security and the Role of Domestic
Agrigultural Production, ¶ 14, G/AG/NG/W/36/Rev.1 (Nov. 9, 2000).
103
See id. ¶¶ 39, 40.
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submission to the WTO Committee on Agriculture, Japan and the
Republic of Korea have emphasized that while trade liberalization
contributes to food security by augmenting domestic production,
“there is always a risk of import interruption” due to wars, conflicts,
export embargoes or restrictions, and other unforeseen
circumstances.104 Citing the 1973 soybeans embargo, they stressed
that their concern was not merely speculative.105 Accordingly, they
argued that since existing WTO law does not provide a guarantee
against import disruptions, every country may exercise its legitimate
right to use domestic production as an insurance against possible
import risks.106 Their claim was vindicated again when, following
the 2008 commodity price hike, many countries resorted to export
restrictions in order to ensure adequate domestic supply or otherwise
insulate their consumers from high international prices.107
By contrast, poverty, rather than export restrictions, is at the
root of food insecurity for developing countries.108 Thus, prohibition
against export bans may not necessarily improve their situation.; it
104

See id. ¶¶ 17, 37, 45.
See id. ¶ 37. The 1973 oil crisis triggered by the Arab-Israeli War
was accompanied by a global food crisis. Consequent to the US embargo,
soybeans disappeared from the Japanese markets, and that forced the
Japanese government to overhaul its national food and agricultural policy
and embrace food self-sufficiency as a government priority. See Osamu
Koyama, The Relationship Between Domestic Agricultural Production and
Food Security: A Japanese Case, in MULTIFUNCTIONALITY IN AGRICULTURE:
EVALUATING THE DEGREE OF JOINTNESS, POLICY IMPLICATIONS 184 (2008).
106
WTO Comm. on Agric., supra note 105, ¶ 5, 8, 45, 50.
107
Quantitative restrictions are still legitimate in food products, only
subject to certain minimal conditions. The insufficiency of the WTO
discipline has been exposed in recent years “when export restrictions
exacerbated or even . . . caused severe disruption and a collapse in
confidence on international markets.” See PRICE VOLATILITY IN FOOD AND
AGRICULTURAL MARKETS: POLICY RESPONSES 25 ¶ 95, 97 (2011), available
at http://www.oecd.org/document/20/0,3746,en_2649_37401_
48152724_1_1_1_37401,00.html.
108
See generally SUMITER S. BROCA, FOOD INSECURITY, POVERTY AND
AGRICULTURE: A CONCEPT PAPER
6
(2002),
available at
http://www.fao.org/3/a-ae405e.pdf (explaining that poverty reduction and
rural development through growth in agriculutre will provide access to food).
Of course, there are also net food importing WTO members among least
developed nations, and there is no doubt that they will be affected by export
restrictions. However, since food insecurity issues exist on both the demand
and supply side, trade liberalization alone does not solve this problem.
105
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may even do a disservice to them. In a fully liberalized trade, food,
like other commodities, would flow towards solvent regions.109 That
means an average Nigerian with an annual consumption expenditure
of just $279 will have to compete with a Luxembourger who can
afford to spend $17,232 per year on consumption.110 On average,
countries where more than 15% of their population is hungry import
less than 10% of their food, compared to over 25% percent in foodsecure countries.111 Therefore, economic development is the only
way to ensure food security for developing countries.
It must also be emphasized that food security being an
equivocal concept, protectionist measures may not necessarily
enhance food security for households.112 In fact, although around a
billion people in the world go hungry every day, ensuring global food
security by boosting production has not been the priority of the
global agricultural trade policy makers. 113 On the contrary,
overproduction of food, generated by generous subsidies in rich
109

Market forces facilitate the movements of goods to places where they can
fetch the most competitive price rather than to places where they have
greater utility. Food is no exception. Even during the Great Irish famine,
food was exported from impoverished Ireland to England. See AMARTYA
SEN, DEVELOPMENT AS FREEDOM 172 (Alfred A. Knopf, Inc. 1999).
110
According to the World Bank, the mean annual consumption
expenditure in Nigeria based on Purchasing Power Party (PPP) is $279,
whereas in Luxembourg it is $17,232. WORLD BANK, WORLD DEVELOPMENT
REPORT: EQUITY AND DEVELOPMENT 6 (Oxford Univ. Press 2005).
111
This is despite the fact that food-secure countries spend less than half as
much of their export earnings as food-insecure ones. See FAO, THE STATE
OF FOOD INSECURITY IN THE WORLD: MONITORING PROGRESS TOWARDS THE
WORLD FOOD SUMMIT AND MILLENNIUM DEVELOPMENT GOALS 18 (FAO
2004).
112
Food security may mean different things, depending on whose
security is at issue. According to FAO, food security “exists when all people,
at all times, have both physical, and economic access to sufficient, safe and
nutritious food that meets their dietary needs and food preferences for an
active and healthy life.”
Food Security Definition, FAO,
http://www.fao.org/hunger/en/ (last visited June 14, 2015). In the WTO
context, however, food security refers to the physical availability of adequate
food at national level. It is concerned solely with the supply side of the
equation.
See
Food
Security,
WORLD
HEALTH
ORG.,
http://www.who.int/trade/glossary/story028/en/ (last visited June 14, 2015).
These are radically different conceptions.
113
See Tesfa G. Gebremedhin, Problems and Prospects of the World
Food Situation, 18(2) J. AGRIBUSINESS 221, 222 (2000).
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nations, has long been regarded as the “[r]eal illness of international
trade in agricultural products.”114 As a result, discouraging food
production now figures as a goal under the AoA. 115 Blue Box
subsidies that go to farmers are now coupled with conditions that
require them to limit production.116 In sum, while governments are
generally sensitive about food security, their sensitivity varies
depending on whose security is at stake.117 Primarily, food is a
necessity and only secondarily a trade commodity. When hunger
strikes, survival is at stake, not just security. Therefore, it is critical
that food security trumps trade or other considerations. However,
national food security shows almost nothing about what happens to
the individual; hence, protectionist measures that are justified on the
ground of food security must be subjected to scrutiny.118

114

MEL ANNALD, INTERNATIONAL AGRICULTURAL TRADE DISPUTES:
CASE STUDIES IN NORTH AMERICA 64 (Andrew Schmitz et al. eds., 2005).
115
ARATHI BHASKAR & JOHN C. BEGHIN, HOW COUPLED ARE
DECOUPLED FARM PAYMENTS? A REVIEW OF THE EVIDENCE 1 (2007).
116
See id. The reason is clear: we live in a world awash with surplus
food. Global food insecurity (in the sense of dearth in aggregate food supply)
is not a genuine problem today. The concern here is rather that
unconditional government support would lead to overproduction of food,
which may, in turn, from a commercial point of view, suppress food prices or
distort world trade in food products.
117
See generally Special Rapporteur on the Right to Food, Economic,
Social and Cultural Rights: The Right to Food, ¶¶ 21–23, Comm’n on
Human Rights, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2004/10 (Feb. 9, 2004) (explaining
agricultural prices have fallen but consumer prices have increased). Nations
that regard food as a matter of national security should not suggest that they
are equally concerned about household food security. The appalling scale of
global hunger is not a testament of any such concern. “No amount of
posturing by statesmen and bureaucrats and no amount of academic debate
and dissection of the ‘technical’ issues can conceal the fact that the
eradication of hunger and malnutrition has not, in practice, been a priority
concern of the vast majority of governments. The political will has clearly
been absent.” THE RIGHT TO FOOD 60 (P. Alston & K. Tomasevski eds.,
1984).
118
A WTO member that invokes food security as a justification for its
protectionist policies must be challenged based on its records in fighting
hunger and malnutrition. National food security, like GDP, conceals more
than it reveals about the lives of individuals. Food security figures, in the
most concrete manner, should be measured only at the individual level, and
that ought to be the yardstick by which a state’s commitment to food security
is measured.
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C. AGRICULTURE AND THE FALSE PROMISE OF
DEVELOPMENT
The historical discontent of developing countries with the
GATT/WTO is nowhere more glaring than in agriculture.119 The
gospel of comparative advantage preached by the North suddenly
vanishes when it comes to agriculture.120 The enormity of economic
gains involved becomes utterly irrelevant. Agriculture represents the
clearest embodiment of the hypocrisy and double standards about
open trade and comparative advantage.121 Agricultural scholar Kevin
Watkins writes that “[i]n the real world of agricultural trade, market
survival depends less upon comparative advantage, than upon
comparative access to subsidies—an area in which northern
producers enjoy unrivaled dominance.” 122 The United Nations
Development Programme (UNDP) adds:
Developed country governments seldom waste an
opportunity to emphasize the virtues of open
markets, level playing fields and free trade,
especially in their prescriptions for poor countries.
Yet the same governments maintain a formidable
array of protectionism barriers against developing
countries. They also spend billions of dollars on
agricultural subsidies. Such policies . . . [deny]
millions of people in developing countries a chance
to share in the benefits of trade. Hypocrisy and
double standards are not strong foundations for

119
Investigations by GATT itself and various committees set up by
GATT have shown how agricultural protectionism in rich countries harms
poor countries. See GATT, TRENDS IN INTERNATIONAL TRADE: REPORT BY A
PANEL OF EXPERTS 80 (1958).
120
Agriculture is “the only area in which export subsidies are [still]
permitted; three-digit tariff levels are common . . . and a number of tradedistortive . . . domestic support measures are still shielded from . . . [the]
dispute settlement system . . . .” DESTA, supra note 4, at 9.
121
See KEVIN WATKINS, AGRICULTURAL TRADE AND FOOD SECUIRTY 4
(1995).
122
Id.
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rule-based multilateral system geared toward
human development.123
From the inception of the GATT, developing nations were wary of
the agreement and wasted no time in voicing their objections to the
U.S. proposal. 124 Some developing countries even witnessed a
decline in their export earnings after joining the GATT.125 As a
result, they demanded equitable trade terms under the GATT
framework. 126 Although the validity of their demands were
corroborated by the GATT’s own investigations, the system still
remains lopsided. 127 Indeed, given their peripheral role in the
negotiation processes, it should not come as a surprise that
developing countries suffer from systemic disadvantages in the
GATT/WTO systems.128 Competition between unequals is unfair
123

U.N. DEV. PROGRAMME [UNDP], HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT:
INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION AT A CROSSROADS: AID, TRADE AND SECURITY
IN AN UNEQUAL WORLD 113 (2005).
124
Developing countries (then, mainly Latin American counties, as
nearly the whole of Africa and many in Asia were under colony) objected to
the U.S. proposal for multilateral trade liberalization in late 1945. “Those
that had been colonies had been taught by their parent countries that
economic benefit was maximized by controlling trade and suppressing
competition from alternative suppliers.” ROBERT E. HUDEC, DEVELOPING
COUNTRIES IN THE GATT LEGAL SYSTEM 12 (1987).
125
Chantal Thomas, Developing Countries and Multilateral Trade
Agreements: Law and the Promise of Development, 108 HARV. L. REV 1715,
1718–19 (1995).
126
When the GATT could not meaningfully address its quest for
structural changes in the global economic order, developing countries turned
to the U.N. Using their numerical advantage, they pushed through the
General Assembly resolutions that were aimed at reforming the existing
global economic relations, the most ambitious of which was the 1974
General Assembly Declaration on the Establishment of a New International
Economic Order (NIEO). The NIEO was based on the recognition that the
existing economic relations were unjust and contrary to the U.N. Charter.
See Declaration on the Establishment of a New International
Economic Order, G.A. Res. 3201 (S-VI), U.N. Doc. A/RES/S-6/3201
(May 1, 1974).
127
“Just as there is a bias within the WTO against ‘non-trade’ interests,
there is a bias in the WTO processes against developing States.” SARAH
JOSEPH, BLAME IT ON THE WTO? A HUMAN RIGHTS CRITIQUE 62 (2011).
128
See generally WTO, WORLD TRADE REPORT 2011: THE WTO AND
PREFERENTIAL TRADE AGREEMENTS: FROM CO-EXISTENCE TO COHERENCE 114
(2011) (explaining that developing countries may be disadvantaged because

2015

WTO AGRICULTURAL TRADE AND
THE UNFULFILLED PROMISE OF DEVELOPMENT

187

enough already; when the dominant parties set the rules of the game,
the weaker players’ capabilities are circumscribed a priori.129 Yet,
the hallmark of trade is competition, not cooperation, and agreements
are curved out of cut-throat negotiations. In view of this, the
expectation that developed nations should be more benevolent
towards their developing partners may be partly misplaced.130
Developing countries face several handicaps in their trade
relationship with the North. First, in the face of pronounced power
differentials, the very idea of a rule-based trading system is a relative
concept.131 Second, although agriculture is the only niche for many
developing countries, trade in high-value agricultural products such
as coffee, banana, and cocoa is dominated by a handful of companies
in industrialized countries and the developing countries’ share of

they are forced to accept rules that are inappropriate for their level of
development). Despite the fact that the GATT/WTO, unlike the Bretton
Woods institutions, had a one-nation, one-vote system, developing countries
had little influence in its decisions. Crucially, the requirement of unanimity
in GATT/WTO decision-making means that negotiations are more important
than the actual voting, and given their limited market share, poor countries
have limited advantage around the negotiating table.
129
See generally RICHARD H. STEINBERG, TRADE ENVIRONMENT
NEGOTIATIONS IN THE EU, NAFTA, AND GATT/WTO: STATE POWER,
INTERESTS, AND THE STRUCTURE OF REGIME SOLUTIONS 14 (1995) (explaining
that powerful countries can force less powerful contries to accept particular
solutions).
130
Despite the rhetoric about trade cooperation, trade largely proceeds
between profit-driven private traders (typically corporations).
This
commonly realized point suggests that the corporate lobby is often powerful
enough to trump the development needs of the poor and similar
considerations.
131
In 1985, for example, the U.S., claiming that the activities of the
Government of Nicaragua constituted a threat to its national security,
invoked GATT Article XXI and banned almost all imports from and exports
to Nicaragua. See Report by the Panel, United States—Trade Measures
Affecting Nicaragua, ¶ 4.1, L/6053 (Oct. 13, 1986). Although Nicaragua
complained and a panel was established, it was of no avail. First, the panel
rightly decided that it could not examine the validity or motivation for the
invocation of Article XXI(b)(iii) by the U.S. (Art XI leaves no room for
evaluating the substantive merit of the of members’ measures). See id.
Second, even if the Panel were to find the U.S. measure to be inconsistent
with its GATT obligations, the ultimate remedy Nicaragua could obtain
would be waiver of its GATT obligations towards the U.S., which had
already been rendered meaningless by the two-way embargo. See id.
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these exports is declining. 132 Third, while no country has
transformed its economy by relying on the export of primary
products, poor countries processed products are subjected to
prohibitive tariffs and non-tariff barriers in rich nations.133 As a
result, trade in processed products is being increasingly dominated by
a handful of vertically integrated corporations.134 For example, in
2007, a pound of roasted Shirkina Sun-Dried Sidamo coffee in a
Starbucks bag commanded $26 in the U.S.135 Nevertheless, the poor
farmer who sun-dried that same coffee in Sidamo, Ethiopia, earned
around just $1 for it.136 Because of the prevailing extreme level of
market concentration and sharp technological disparities, the share of
least developed countries (LCDs) in processed agricultural exports
has dropped from a negligible 0.7% in the 1980s to just 0.3% by the
1990s.137 Perhaps the most formidable handicap of poor countries is
the lack of technology. 138 For example, from 2000 to 2003,
agricultural labor productivity in LCDs was less than 1% that of the
level in developed nations.139 With such a magnitude of productivity
differential, it is uncertain if trade liberalization alone can address the
132

Just four companies control 40% of the global trade in coffee. Six
chocolate manufacturers that dominate cocoa production and trade claim half
of the global sales from chocolates. The EU countries alone account for 40%
of total agricultural exports, up from around 20% in the 1960s. In contrast,
developing countries that were net agricultural exporters in the 1960s are
now net importers. See FAO, THE STATE OF AGRICULTURAL COMMODITY
MARKETS 30–33 (2004).
133
See Hans Peter Lankes, Market Access for Developing Countries,
INT’L MONETARY FUND, http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/fandd/2002/
09/lankes.htm (last visited June 14 2015).
134
See CORPORATE POWER AND GLOBAL AGRIFOOD GOVERNANCE 27–29
(Jennifer Clapp & Doric Fuchs eds., 2009); see also WORLD BANK, WORLD
DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2008: AGRICULTURE FOR DEVELOPMENT supra note
10, at 135.
135
See Stephan Faris, Starbucks vs. Ethiopia: The Country that Gave
the World the Coffee Bean and the Company that Invented the $4 Latte are
Fighting over a Trademark, FORTUNE (Feb. 26, 2007, 5:56 AM)
http://money.cnn.com/magazines/fortune/fortune_archive/2007/03/05/84013
43/index.htm.
136
See id.
137
See FAO, supra note 132, at 26.
138
See UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT,
THE LEAST DEVELOPED COUNTRIES REPORT 2006: DEVELOPING PRODUCTIVE
CAPACITIES 163 (2006).
139
See id. at IX.
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needs of the poor.140 Yet, although the UN Charter and various
international treaties oblige the dissemination of agricultural
technology, the WTO agreements ensure the perpetuation of a
technological divide. 141 Fourth, while effective trade bargaining
requires coalition building, the diversity of developing countries
hinders them from forging a common front. 142 Fifth, developing
countries’ traditional obsession on Special and Differential (S&D)
treatment seems to further marginalize them at the negotiating
table.143 In addition, poor countries have such limited representation
in Geneva that their delegates struggle to grasp what is under
discussion, let alone influence the course of events during complex
negotiations.144 The WTO legal framework is so complex that it is
140

See generally id. (reasoning that trade liberalization alone cannot
solve this problem). In fact, some developing countries had been granted
tariff preferences through various schemes, such as the Lomé Convention
(replaced by the Cotonou Agreement in 2000), the Everything But Arms
(EBA) initiative, and the United States’ Africa Growth Opportunity Act
(AGOA). Yet, the fact that these schemes have not resulted in enhanced
agricultural exports from those poor nations to Europe and the U.S. suggests
that the problem is deeper than tariff preference can cure. ‘‘Today, the share
of world exports of Sub-Saharan Africa . . . is less than one-half that of
Belgium . . . . If Africa enjoyed the same share of world exports as it did in
the 1980s, its exports today would be some $119 billion higher . . . about five
times aid flows and budget savings from debt services relief provided by
high-income countries in 2002.” UNDP, supra note 123, at 117.
141
See Nancy Birdsall & Robert Z. Lawrence, Deep Integration and
Trade Agreements, in GLOBAL PUBLIC GOODS: INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION
IN THE 21ST CENTURY 128, 144 (Inge Kaul et al. eds., 1999), available at
http://web.undp.org/globalpublicgoods/TheBook/globalpublicgoods.pdf.
142
“Effective bargaining in [multilateral trade negotiations] requires
coalition building, so that, aside from the United States and Japan, blocks of
countries became the major players negotiating on all issues.” Raymond F.
Hopkins, Developing Countries in the Uruguay Round: Bargaining Under
Uncertainty and Inequality, in WORLD AGRICULTURE AND THE GATT 143
(William P. Avery ed., 1993).
143
Developing countries have traditionally lobbied for “Special &
Differential” treatment; but “free ridership” often comes at a cost, and in this
case their bargaining power is the price to be paid. This means that
multilateral trade negotiations will be conducted essentially among
industrialized nations. See generally STIGLITZ & CHARLTON, supra note 4, at
43.
144
In the 2005 Ministerial Meeting in Hong Kong, for instance, 356
delegates represented the U.S., while Burundi had just three. As a result,
after days of arduous negotiations when delegates became exhausted and
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“probably fully understood by no nation that has accepted it,
including some of the richest and most powerful trading nations.”145
If well-resourced nations, including those that helped design the
system and negotiated agreements, are represented by delegates with
the highest level of expertise who still struggle to fully understand
the system, how poor members that are represented by only one or
two delegates would fare is easy to guess.146 Sixth, the very culture
of negotiation at the WTO excludes many members from “important
aspects of deal-brokering.” 147 Finally, the Agreement on the
Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (SPS) and the
Agreement on Technical Barrier to Trade (TBT) are viewed by the
developing world as bottlenecks, as they reflect the standards of
developed nations and may be employed for protectionist
purposes.148 In practice, implementation of these agreements has
proven to be costly.149
sleep deprived, those delegates in large numbers could take turns sleeping,
while the rest “had to be on 24-hour duty.” See OXFAM INT’L, BRIEFING
PAPER NO. 85, WHAT HAPPENED IN HONG KONG? 5 (2005).
145
JOHN H. JACKSON, The Uruguay Round and the WTO: The New
Organization and its Antecedents, in THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION 1
(1998).
146
See id.
147
“The negotiating culture of the GATT served to exclude numerous
Members from important aspects of deal-brokering. Policies and treaties
were negotiated in notorious ‘Green Room’ meetings to which only certain
Members were invited, and in which discussions were secret. Green Room
decisions were then presented to other Members as faits accomplis.” JOSEPH,
supra note 127, at 63; see also UNDP, DEEPENING DEMOCRACY IN A
FRAGMENTED WORLD, HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2002, at 118 (Oxford
Univ. Press 2002). The green room refers to a process, rather than a location
or physical structure.
148
See generally UNCTAD, International Trade in Genetically
Modified Organisms and Multilateral Negotiations: A New Dilemma for
Developing Countries, ¶ 128, UNCTAD/DITC/TNCD/1 (July 5, 2000)
(“[T]he basic concept of the precautionary principle is already present in the
WTO in several key provisions, such as the SPS and TBT Agreements.”).
149
Implementations of WTO agreements regarding customs valuation,
sanitary and phytosanitary measures (SPS), and intellectual property rights
(TRIPs) are estimated to cost a typical developing country around $150
million, which is equivalent to the annual development budget of many least
developed nations. See Dani Rodrik, The Global Governance of Trade: As if
Development Really Mattered 30 (July, 2001) (unpublished paper prepared
for the UNDP, Harvard Univ.).
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In general, although developing countries are the
overwhelming majority in the WTO,150 their influence has always
been minimal. 151 For example, almost three-quarters of the 108
countries that participated in the Uruguay Round negotiations were
developing nations.152 However, a few protagonists, notably the U.S.
and the EU, once again mainly determined the outcome of the
round.153 As a consequence, the balance not only in tariff reduction
on industrial products, which was the traditional pursuit of the GATT,
but also in all of the so-called new issues, was tilted in favor of rich
nations.154 The four new issues added into the GATT, like Trade in
Services (TIS), Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property
(TRIPS), and Trade-Related Investment Measures (TRIMS),
unarguably reflect the priorities of developed nations and their
corporations.155 What remains is agriculture. Given the greater stake
developing countries have in the sector, one would expect them to
have a significant role in agricultural negotiations.156 However, the
battle on agriculture was mainly a two-way showdown between the
EU and the U.S.157 Many of the outstanding disagreements were
hammered out by the bilateral agreement between the two powers in
the Blair House Accord.158
150
See Understanding the WTO: Developing Countries, WTO,
https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/dev1_e.htm (last
visited June 14, 2015).
151
See YASH TANDON, NORTH-SOUTH INST., TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE AS
A POLITICAL INSTRUMENT 71–72 (2002).
152
See id.
153
See id.
154
See Hopkins, supra note 142, at 143.
155
See id. at 160–62.
156
Interestingly, developing countries did not draft any special positions
on agricultural trade liberalization during the first five years of the Uruguay
Round negotiations; however, the proposal for compensation by a group of
five food aid receiving countries (Egypt, Jamaica, Mexico, Morocco, and
Peru), is the exception. Developing countries’ participation was largely
limited to reacting to the initiatives of others. See id. at 149–50.
157
Power relationships between rich countries, especially the U.S. and
the EU, explain much of the history of the postwar multilateral trading
system. See STIGLITZ & CHARLTON, supra note 4, at 43–44.
158
The agreement reached between the U.S. and the EU at the Blair
House in Washington, D.C. is considered a momentous event not only for
agriculture, but also for the conclusion of the round. Of course, because the
accord was bilateral, it had to be accepted by other negotiators, notably the
Cairns Group, which traditionally advocated greater market expansion;
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Undertaking costly commitments, such as those embodied in
agreements on new issues, developing countries would legitimately
expect commensurate tariff cuts on the part of rich nations. 159
However, studies show that average tariff cuts in developed countries
were actually much less than that agreed to by developing nations.160
Access to rich nations’ markets for agricultural products, particularly
processed products, is limited due to prohibitive tariffs and generous
subsidies in those countries.161

III. AGRICULTURE IN THE GATT/WTO SYSTEM
Agriculture contributed to and suffered from the Great
Depression.162 Surplus agricultural production in the 1920s caused
prices to slump and brought agricultural trade to a standstill. 163
Governments responded to the crisis by adopting interventionist
policies in the form of price controls, production planning and
allocation of inputs, food rationing, trade restrictions, and others.164
Such policies continued through the war and beyond.165 Farmers
were impoverished to the point that they needed “the provisions of
‘the welfare state’ that was everywhere being created.”166 Against
countries that opposed sweeping agricultural trade reform include Japan, the
Republic of Korea, and the Philippines. See TIMOTHY E. JOSLING ET AL.,
AGRICULTURE IN THE GATT 156–63 (1996); DESTA, supra note 4, at 65–66.
159
See J. MICHAEL FINGER & L. ALAN WINTERS, RECIPROCIY IN THE
WTO 56 (Bernard M. Hoekman et al. eds., 2002).
160
See id.
161
Even in industry, developed countries subject developing countries’
exports to tariff rates that are three to four times higher than the rates applied
to other rich countries’ products. See UNDP, supra note 93, at 127.
162
See NEW YORK TIMES ALMANAC 304 (John W. Wright et al. eds.,
2001).
163
See id.
164
The U.S. Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1933 is worth mentioning
here. This Act not only extended to producers of basic crops’ support prices,
but also empowered the President to raise tariffs by up to fifty percent or
impose quotas on imports if such imports materially interfered with the
agricultural adjustment program. See JOSLING ET AL., supra note 158, at 11–
12.
165
See id. at 11. In the U.S. in particular, “following World War II,
more than half of what the farmers collected in the market place for certain
crops—such as peanuts and sorghum grain—resulted from government aid
programs.” PAUL A. SAMUELSON, ECONOMICS 388 (11th ed. 1980).
166
See JOSLING ET AL., supra note 158, at 11.
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such an existential backdrop, it is apparent that the architects of the
multilateral trading system did not anticipate that states would open
up their agricultural sectors for global competition anytime soon.167
A. THE GATT ERA
Agriculture was in principle covered by GATT rules. 168
However, it had effectively eluded any meaningful discipline for
decades due to sweeping exemptions; in particular, from the
prohibition of quantitative restrictions and export subsidies under
Articles XI and XVI, respectively.169 Protectionism was at its height
during the interwar period and came mostly in the form of non-tariff
measures, such as quantitative restrictions. 170 Thus, eliminating
quantitative restrictions formed one of the priorities of the postwar
multilateral trade agenda. 171 As a result, GATT Article XI, §1,
prohibits the use of “prohibitions or restrictions other than duties,

167
Agriculture is often considered “the GATT’s greatest failure.”
JOACHIM ZIETZ & ALBERTO VALDÉS, AGRICULTURE IN THE GATT:
ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES TO REFORM 10 (1988). It should be stressed,
however, that from the beginning, the ambitious plan to liberalize global
trade deliberately left agriculture out of the frame of discussion. Even the
Havana Charter made exceptions to rules prohibiting quantitative restrictions.
See generally Havana Charter, supra note 48, arts. 20, 25–28 (excepting
“export prohibitions or restrictions applied for the period necessary to
prevent or relieve critical shortages of foodstuffs or other products essential
to the exporting Member country” and “import and export prohibitions or
restrictions necessary to the application of standards or regulations for the
classification, grading or marketing of commodities in international trade”).
168
See R. Sharma, Agriculture in the GATT: A Historical Account, in
FAO, MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS IN AGRICULTURE: A RESOURCE
MANUAL 4, 4.2 (2000).
169
See GATT, supra note 47, arts. XI, XVI.
170
See generally Barry Eichengreen & Douglas A. Irwin, The Slide to
Protectionism in the Great Depression: Who Succumbed and Why? 871
(Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 15142, 2009) (“[T]here
was considerable variation in the extent to which countries imposed
protectionist measures. While some countries raised tariffs sharply and
imposed draconian controls on foreign exchange transactions, others
tightened trade and exchange restrictions only marginally.”).
171
See WILLIAM H. COOPER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL31356, FREE
TRADE AGREEMENTS: IMPACT ON U.S. TRADE AND IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S.
TRADE POLICY 4 (2014).
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taxes or other charges.”172 However, Article XI §2 declares that such
prohibition does not apply to agriculture.173 Agriculture was likewise
exempted from the prohibition of export subsidies.174 Article XVI §3
only advises contacting parties to “seek to avoid the use of subsidies
on the export of primary products.” 175 These exceptions were
tailored to the agricultural policies of the major architect of the
GATT, the U.S.176 Yet, the U.S. was unwilling to comply even with
the minimal requirements of Articles XI and XVI, and it continued to
pursue inconsistent policies until it eventually sought and obtained a
waiver in 1955.177 Given its influence in the GATT process, the
U.S.’s retreat meant that the issue would remain stalled until the U.S.
itself would pick it up again.178
The establishment of the European Common Agricultural
Policy (CAP) in 1962 was yet another significant obstacle to
agricultural trade liberalization.179 Conversely, the CAP forced the
U.S. to rethink its position on agriculture and initiate the launching of
the Kennedy Round in 1963.180 CAP subsidies not only transformed

172

GATT, supra note 47, art. XI, § 1.
See id, § 2.
174
See id., art. XVI.
175
Id. These agricultural loopholes expanded further as GATT
discipline on industrial products tightened. In 1955, the U.S. was granted a
waiver from its obligations under GATT Articles II and XI. The EU
established the Common Agricultural Policy in the early 1960s and
consolidated preexisting protectionism. Moreover, newly joining GATT
Contracting Parties were keen to use the “grandfather clause” to protect their
agricultural sectors.
See VICTOR MOSOTI & AMBRA GOBENA,
INTERNATIONAL TRADE RULES AND THE AGRICULTURAL SECTOR 34–36
(2007).
176
Article XI is considered a multilateral embodiment of Section 22 of
the U.S. Agricultural Adjustment Act, which sanctioned the use of import
quotas for a list of agricultural products. See Theodore H. Cohn, The
Changing Role of the United States in the Global Agricultural Trade Regime,
7 INT’L POL. ECON. Y.B. 17, 36 (1993).
177
See JACKSON, supra note 28, at 314; JOSLING ET AL., supra note 158,
at 13–14.
178
See JACKSON, supra note 28, at 314.
179
See generally CHRISTINA L. DAVIS, FOOD FIGHTS OVER FREE TRADE:
HOW INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS PROMOTE AGRICULTURAL TRADE
LIBERALIZATION 227 (2003).
180
See Alberta Sbragia, The EU, the US, and Trade Policy: Competitive
Interdependence In the Management of Globalization (Apr. 23–25, 2009)
173
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the EC from a net importer into a net exporter of major agricultural
products, but also remarkably boosted the EC’s share in the global
agricultural market as the U.S.’s share decreased.181 CAP policies
proved to be major sources of trade wrangling, especially between
the EC and the U.S.182 Interestingly, it was not long after it had
obtained a waiver that the U.S. reversed its position and took the lead
in the attempt to bring agriculture into a meaningful GATT discipline
during the Kennedy Round, but without success.183 The U.S. tried
once again in the Tokyo Round, but failed.184 In the Uruguay Round,
the U.S., backed by the Cairns Group “mounted an almost do or die
effort” to see to it that agriculture was integrated into the trading
system.185 After dragging it out for years, the conclusion of the
Round was in sight when the U.S. and the EC reached a basic
agreement on agriculture in the Blair House Accord.186
B.

THE URUGUAY ROUND AGREEMENT ON AGRICULTURE

The GATT Ministerial Declaration that launched the
Uruguay Round of multilateral negotiations in 1986 in Punta del Este
resolved that the negotiations would achieve “further liberalization
and expansion of world trade to the benefit of all countries,
especially less-developed contracting parties.” 187 For many lessdeveloped countries, no sector has greater significance than
agriculture.188 Hence, examining whether, and to what extent, their
(unpublished conference paper), available at
http://aei.pitt.edu/33126/1/sbragia._alberta.pdf.
181
See DAVIS, supra note 179, at 273.
182
Thirty-five of the forty-five complaints under GATT against the EC
between 1970 and 1989 relate to agriculture. Similarly, almost two-thirds of
the complaints against the EU during the first five years of the WTO relate to
agricultural products. See id. at 227–28.
183
See JACKSON, supra note 28, at 314–16.
184
See id.
185
Id.
186
See id.; see also Robert L. Paarlberg, Why Agriculture Blocked the
Uruguay Round: Evolving Strategies in a Two-Level Game, 7 INT’L POL.
ECON. Y.B. 39, 47 (1993).
187
GATT, Ministerial Declaration on the Uruguay Round, 25 I.L.M.
1623, 1624 (1986).
188
Mike Moore, Dir.-Gen., WTO, Statement on WTO Negotiations:
Agriculture and Developing Countries (Dec. 6, 2000), available at
https://www.wto.org/english/news_e/spmm_e/spmm47_e.htm.
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interests have been reflected in the AoA provides a unique parameter
to evaluate if the above declaration carries anything beyond rhetoric.
The AoA is regarded as one of the most important
achievements of the Uruguay Round.189 It is praised for putting an
end to the decades-long neglect of agriculture.190 However, if the
AoA is a success, it is more for providing a framework for future
negotiations rather than for actually integrating agriculture into the
mainstream GATT/WTO discipline. Agriculture is still substantially
more distorted than trade in any other product.191 Substantively, the
merits of the AoA can only be judged by examining to what extent it
has resolved longstanding problems of agricultural trade.
1.

STRUCTURE OF THE AGREEMENT

The AoA is the first multilateral agreement dedicated to
agriculture.192 It contains just twenty-one articles and five annexes,
establishing generally applicable rules and standards.193 The details
of actual quantitative commitments are contained in country
schedules.194 The Agreement is structured along three main areas of
189

Josling, supra note 31, at 168.
See id.
191
See generally Dimitrios G. Demekas et al., The Effects of the
Common Agricultural Policy of the European Community: A Survey of
Literature, 2 J. OF COMMON MARKET STUD. 97, 132 (1988).
192
It should be noted, however, that all GATT rules governing trade in
goods still apply to agricultural trade. See ANDERSON & MARTIN, supra note
18, at 15. With the establishment of the WTO, GATT, the de facto
institution, has become history. However, GATT, the agreement, is still
alive, constituting one of the thirteen major agreements incorporated under
Annex 1A to the agreement establishing the WTO. See Multilateral
Agreement on Trade in Goods, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement
Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1A, 1867 U.N.T.S 154,
175.
193
See generally AoA, supra note 56.
194
The schedule represents a member’s list of commitments and the
subject of the committment. See Guide to Reading the GATS Schedules of
Specific Commitments and the List of Article II (MFN) Exemptions, WTO,
https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/serv_e/guide1_e.htm (last visited June
14, 2015). Regarding tariffs, for example, each member country’s schedule
contains the commitments the country has made, including the tariff rates on
each product covered, tariff ceiling, etc. Id. Schedules of concessions are an
integral part of the GATT as explicitly stated under Article 3(1) of the AoA
and GATT Article II: 7. AoA, supra note 56, at art. 3(1); GATT, supra note
190
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discipline, known as “pillars”, which include market access, export
competition, and domestic support.195 It imposes essentially three
types of obligations: to increase market access for agricultural
imports, to convert non-tariff measures into tariffs (subject to
exceptions), and to reduce export subsidy and domestic support.196
The agreement also accords special and differential treatment to
developing countries, albeit generally limited to lower reductions and
longer implementation periods, rather than improved market access,
as the preamble of the AoA suggests.197
2.

MARKET ACCESS

Market access sums up the central thrust of trade
agreements. Trade agreements are fundamental concessions by states
to open up their markets for each other’s exports.198 Market access
has been by far the most important source of trade wrangling. A
cursory look at agricultural trade disputes shows that out of 127
disputes and requests for consultation, 50 involved alleged violations

47, at art. II:7. Schedules that countries agreed to during the Uruguay Round
combined to consist of around twenty thousand pages. WTO, THE WTO
AGREEMENT SERIES 2: GENERAL AGREEMENT ON TARIFFS AND TRADE 2
(1998).
195
Market access concerns mainly border measures on imports that may
serve to limit the competitiveness of imported products in the domestic
market, among other things; export subsidies are intended to achieve the
opposite—boost the competitiveness of domestic products in foreign
markets. See WTO, UNDERSTANDING THE WTO 12–13 (5th ed. 2015).
Domestic support, on the other hand, encompasses a range of support
measures, including direct market price support to farmers. See Domestic
Support:
Amber,
Blue
and
Green
Boxes,
WTO,
https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/agric_e/negs_bkgrnd13_boxes_
e.htm (last visited June 14, 2015).
196
See UNCTAD, Dispute Settlement, World Trade Organization: 3.15
Agriculture, 3, UNCTAD/EDM/Misc.232/Add.32 (2003).
197
The preamble of the AoA states that “Special and Differential”
treatment given to developing countries would mainly take the form of
market access to their products. See AoA, supra note 56, ¶ 5. This,
however, has not been reflected in the operative rules, including the
schedules of concession. See Josling, supra note 31, at 68.
198
See generally Free Trade Agreements, INT’L TRADE ADMIN.,
http://trade.gov/fta/ (last visited June 14, 2015).
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of Article 4 of the AoA, i.e., market access.199 Countries traditionally
employ two kinds of barriers to restrict or ban the free movements of
goods into their territories: tariff and non-tariff barriers.200 Of the two,
non-tariff measures are particularly disliked.201 They are generally
viewed as symbols of protectionism, discrimination, and
arbitrariness. 202 Accordingly, eliminating quantitative restrictions
figured prominently in the priorities of GATT. Nevertheless,
exceptions such as those under GATT Articles XX and XXI are
reminders that complete elimination of non-tariff barriers is
unrealistic. Still, phasing out non-tariff barriers was one of the major
priorities of the AoA. Further, the AoA also mandates the
conversion of non-tariff barriers into tariffs,203 a process known as
tarifficaton. One justification for this is that unlike quantitative
restrictions, which tend to be arbitrary, tariffs impose an equivalent
burden on all exporters.204
a. Tariffication
Article 4(2) of the AoA ensures that, subject to certain
exceptions, ordinary tariffs are the only legitimate form of boarder

199

See Disputes by Agreement, WTO,
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/dispu_agreements_index_e.htm
?id=A1#selected_agreement (last visited June 14, 2015).
200
See PETROS C. MAVROIDIS, TRADE IN GOODS: THE GATT AND THE
OTHER AGREEMENTS REGULATING TRADE IN GOODS 72 (2007).
201
Id.
202
Both tariffs and non-tariff barriers may effectively curtail the free
movement of goods. However, while GATT set out to eliminate quantitative
restriction, subject to exceptions of course, it appears that eliminating tariffs
in toto has never been figured as the objective of the GATT/WTO. See id.
Trade talks on tariffs are normally about reducing them, not eliminating them
altogether. See id.; see also DESTA, supra note 4, at 16–19.
203
Originally, the U.S. proposed a complete phase out of non-tariff
barriers to occur within ten years. The EU and rice-producing countries,
particularly Japan and Korea, did not agree. In the end, it was again the U.S.
that formally proposed tariffication as a compromise. While the EC accepted
the proposal subject to a number of conditions, Japan and Korea went on to
secure special privileges to delay implementation of tariffication under
Annex 5. See DESTA, supra note 4, at 63–64; Josling, supra note 31, at 169.
204
See General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, WTO,
https://www.wto.org/english/res_e/booksp_e/analytic_index_e/gatt1994_05_
e.htm (last visited June 14, 2015).
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restriction in agriculture. 205 Tariffication has thus ended the
longstanding agricultural exception to GATT Article XI.206 Crucially,
it also requires tariff bindings and reductions to improve, or at least
maintain, existing levels of market access.207 As such, agriculture
has become the first area where nearly all tariff lines are bound.208 In
addition, as the important footnote to Article 4(2) affirms,209 country
specific derogations from GATT provisions, such as waivers or
protocols of accession cannot be invoked to institute quantitative
restrictions on agriculture.210 It must also be emphasized that the
AoA even rejects customs duties other than ordinary duties. 211
However, the trickiest part of the story is that tariffication generally
resulted in exceedingly high tariff rates.212 Thus, the practical effect
of tariffication in addressing the problem of market access has been
unremarkable.
Article 4(2) is not without exceptions.
Quantitative
restrictions may be provisionally employed for safeguard purposes in
accordance with Article 5. 213 Annex 5 to the AoA contains further
exceptions to the tariffication requirement. 214 In both cases the
205

AoA, supra note 56, at art. 4(2).
For more information on measures that must be converted into
ordinary customs duties under Article 4(2), see id. at n.1.
207
Tariff bindings refers to tariff ceilings beyond which countries
cannot raise tariffs. Additionally, member countries have committed to cut
average tariff levels by 36% and tariffs per product by a minimum of 15%.
Two-thirds of these percentage rates apply to developing nations.
208
DESTA, supra note 4, at 66–67.
209
See AoA, supra note 56, at art. 4(2) n.1.
210
See Josling, supra note 31, at 180.
211
What so-called ordinary customs duties refers to is not clear;
however, footnote 1 of Art 4(2) explains that such restrictions include
variable import levies, minimum import prices, and voluntary export
restraints, which are basically forms of customs duties and are not considered
as ordinary customs duties. See AoA, supra note 56, at art. 4(2) n.1.
212
DESTA, supra note 4, at 75–76.
213
The idea here is that the removal of quantitative restrictions might
trigger import surges, in which case the country concerned is allowed to use
safeguard measures to deal with the situation. This is in addition to GATT
exceptions that are applicable to any trade in goods, such as those under
Articles VI (antidumping), XII (safeguards), XIX (emergency), XX (general
exceptions), and XXI (national security). See AoA, supra note 56, at art. 5.
214
Annex 5 to the agreement covers products that have been designated
as meriting special treatment, mainly on account of their vitality for food
security. See id.
206
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criteria are clearly specified.215 Also, in regards to food products,
export restrictions are legitimate under Article 12, subject to the
obligation to give due consideration to the effects of such
prohibitions or restrictions on importing members’ food security,
giving advance notice in writing, and consultation upon request with
other WTO members. 216 Developing countries that are not net
exporters of the foodstuff in issue are exempt altogether.217
b.

Tariff Reduction

Tariffication per se does not improve market access; the
tariff must also be low. However, in many instances agricultural
tariff rates today are almost as high as before the Uruguay Round,218
and in some cases are even higher.219 Countries used a range of
avenues to manipulate commitments made and set their tariffs as
high as possible. For one, the base period chosen (1986–1988) “was
a time of very high protection levels.”220 Second, the actual process
of tariffication was left to individual members.221 Thus, countries
easily inflated their domestic prices while understating world prices
to result in tariff rates which were more protectionist than nontariff
barriers were during the base period. 222
Tariff reduction
commitments also allow a degree of flexibility. While members have
agreed to reduce tariffs by an average of 36%, they can still maintain
relatively high tariffs with just 15% reduction on sensitive
products.223
Importantly, processed agricultural products are subjected to
significantly higher tariffs than raw products. For example, in
215

See id.
See id.
217
See id. at art. 12(2).
218
See Tariffs: More Binding and Closer to Zero, WTO,
https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/
tif_e/agrm2_e.htm (last visited June 14, 2015).
219
See id.
220
KAREN Z. ACKERMAN ET AL., USDA, AGRICULTURE IN THE
WTO 8 (1998).
221
See ANITA REGMI ET AL., USDA, MARKET ACCESS FOR HIGH-VALUE
FOOD 1, 4 (2005).
222
See id.
223
See Juan A. Marchetti & Martin Roy, The TISA Initiative: An
Overview of Market Access Issues 6–14 (World Trade Org. Econ. Research
and Stat. Div., Staff Working Paper ERSD-2013-11, 2003).
216
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Canada processed food products are subject to tariffs that are twelve
times higher than first stage products.224 The EU imposes tariffs
from 0% to 9% on cocoa paste, but it grows to 30% on the final
product. 225 It is clear that such tariff escalation excludes poor
countries from high-value agricultural market, and hinders their
integration into the global economy. Therefore, it is no wonder that
the share of LCDs in processed agricultural exports has declined over
the years.226
In sum, although there are issues associated with tariff
choices, tariffication may have made agricultural trade more
transparent. 227 Yet, high tariffs coupled with an array of domestic
support leave much to be desired in terms of actual market openings
in the sector. Tariffs on agricultural imports remain up to three times
higher than those on industrial products.228 Such an asymmetric
tariff structure is clearly unhelpful for many poor countries that rely
heavily on agricultural exports. More puzzling is the fact that tariffs
on tropical agricultural products are generally higher than those on
temperate zone agricultural products.229 Substantively, the AoA has
not addressed the massive trade imbalance against developing
countries.230 For all its achievements, the Uruguay Round is thus
criticized as skewed and disappointing for developing nations. 231
224

UNDP, supra note 123, at 127.
Id.
226
SEE HAROLD M. HARRIS, JR. & GEOFFREY A. BENSON, SOUTHERN
EXTENSION INT’L TRADE TASK FORCE, SOUTHERN AGRICULTURE IN A WORLD
ECONOMY, 8, SRDC No. 198-1 (2013).
227
See WTO, MARKET ACCESS FOR GOODS AND NON-AGRICULTURAL
MARKET ACCESS (NAMA) NEGOTIATIONS 92–93 (2012); see generally Harry
de Gorter & Erika Kliauga, Reducing Tariff Versus Expanding Tariff Rate
Quotas, in Anderson & Martin, supra note 18, at 17 (explaining that there
are issues of transparency and clarity in the implementation processes for
tariffs).
228
See Josling, supra note 31, at 105.
229
OLIVIER DE SCHUTTER
&
FRIEDRICH-EBERT-STIFTUNG,
INTERNATIONAL TRADE IN AGRICULTURE AND THE RIGHT TO FOOD 12–13
(2009).
230
See Anderson & Martin, supra note 18, at 7–12 (as noted above,
agriculture is the only area most poor nations can hope to gain a fair share of
the fruits of international trade, and as the Uruguay Round agreements offer
little for such hope to materialize, sights are set on Doha, which so far has
unfortuantely failed to redeem past inequalities).
231
See Julio J. Nogués, Agricultural Exporters in a Protectionist World:
Review and Policy Implications of Barriers against Marcosur 9 (Inst. for the
225
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While some export-oriented truly developing countries have
benefited, many of them are net losers of the Round.232
3.

EXPORT COMPETITION

In the beginning, Article XVI of the GATT did not prohibit
the use of subsidies in all products.233 It contained modest, if not
meaningless, requirements of notification and consultation.234 The
absence of any meaningful restraint on subsidies tended to cancel out
the achievements gained through tariff reduction. As a result, the
1955 amendment expanded Article XVI to include more specific
prohibitions on export subsidies.235 Article 3 of the Agreement on
Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (SCM Agreement) has
reinforced this prohibition. 236 Export subsidies are prohibited
because they may result in “dumping,” i.e., products being sold in
foreign markets for far less than their cost of production.237 Dumping
has long been considered an unfair trade practice because it distorts
Integration of Latin America and the Caribbean, Working Paper 16, 2004);
Watkins, supra note 124, at 4 (“The Uruguay Round will not substantially
alter this [biased] position, except to enhance the advantage of the northern
agriculture…the subsidy systems of the major industrial countries will
remain intact, while developing countries will be required to further
liberalize access to their markets. This imbalance is not widely recognized in
developing countries, where the UR [Uruguay Round] agreement has been
welcomed as the first step towards a more stable food trading system. But
like most acts of fraud, the UR agreement is better understood by its
architects, in this case the EU and the US, than by its victims.”).
232
STIGLITZ & CHARLTON, supra note 4, at 46–47 (estimating that the
least forty-eight developed countries will sustain an annual loss of $600
million as a result of the Uruguay Round).
233
See LARS BRINK, COMMITMENTS UNDER THE WTO AGREEMENT ON
AGRICULTURE AND THE DOHA DRAFT MODALITIES: HOW DO THEY COMPARE
TO CURRENT POLICY? 27–34 (2014).
234
See DESTA, supra note 4, at 103.
235
See generally id. at 99 (“If the term ‘trade war’ has been used in
connection with the GATT/WTO system . . . a substantial majority of cases
must have been related to the sphere of agricultural trade in general and
export subsidies in particular.”).
236
See Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, Apr. 15,
1994, 1869 U.N.T.S. 14.
237
See Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994 (Anti-Dumping Agreement), 1868
U.N.T.S. 201.
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fair competition, entitling the affected party to respond by the use of
anti-dumping and countervailing duties.238 In agriculture, however,
export subsidies have always been legitimate within the “equitable
share” provision in Article XVI of the GATT.239
The AoA does not prohibit export subsidies either—a
cynical view may be that an agreement that was carved essentially
out of an accord between two major subsidizers and exporters of
agriculture; i.e., the EU and U.S., could not be expected to prohibit
export subsidy in the first place. Both parties are still firm on
maintaining agricultural support, and subsidy was not the issue that
principally divided them.240 The fact that both the U.S. and EU
strongly sought the renewal of the peace clause during the Doha
negotiations is an indication of their desire to maintain their
agricultural subsidies.241 However, the AoA subjects subsidies to
reduction. Article 9 enumerates the types of subsidies subject to
reduction, while actual reduction commitments are contained in
country schedules. 242 Reduction commitments under Article
9.2(b)(iv) require developed countries to cut budgetary outlays by
36% and the quantities of subsidized exports by 21% over a six-year
period based on their 1986–1990 levels.243 Developing countries
must cut their budgetary outlays and quantities of subsidized exports
by 24% and 14% respectively, two-thirds of the rate for developed
countries, over a ten-year period, while least-developed members are
exempt altogether.244
238

JACKSON, supra note 28, at 247–77.
See R. Pearce & R. Sharma, Export Subsidies, in MULTILATERAL
TRADE NEGOTIATIONS ON AGRICULTURE: A RESOURCE MANUAL 3.3 (2002).
240
RAJ BHALA, INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW: INTERDISCIPLINARY
THEORY AND PRACTICE 94 (3d. ed., 2008) (explaining that the EU and the
U.S. have differences on the definition of export subsidy. The EU accounts
for around 90% of direct export subsidies paid by the developed world.
However, the EU accuses the U.S. of using food aid and other forms of
support programs (amounting to indirect export subsidy), which, when
combined, makes the U.S. an even larger subsidizer).
241
See Matthew C. Porterfield, U.S. Farm Subsidies and the Expiration
of the WTO's Peace Clause, 27 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 1002, 1032 (2006).
242
See AoA, supra note 56, at art. 9.
243
See id.
244
See id. (noting that art 9.2(b) allows flexibility in implementation).
From 1996 to 1999, a country could exceed its export subsidy commitments
or carryover unused subsidies as long as the cumulative export subsidy did
not exceed the total commitments in its schedule and netiher the annual
239

204

SOUTH CAROLINA JOURNAL OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW & BUSINESS

[Vol. 11.2

On the surface, poor countries are free riders as far as export
subsidy commitments are concerned. In reality, however, they
cannot afford to maintain meaningful subsidies in the first place;
most of them cannot even afford to exempt the sector from
taxation. 245 It is well known that all developed nations have
historically used subsidies (and other forms of protectionist measures)
until they ensured that their industries were ready for global
competition. 246 Accordingly, it is argued that reducing subsidies
adversely and disproportionately affects developing countries in the
long term.247 However, at present not only are poor countries unable
to maintain subsidies even to the permitted level, but their primary
preoccupation is market access; accordingly, they generally favor
reduction or the elimination of subsidies.248 Yet studies show that
after the implementation period, agricultural subsidies in OECD
countries remains staggeringly high.249 According to the UNDP,
The basic problem to be addressed in the WTO
negotiations on agriculture can be summarized in
three words: rich country subsidies. In the last
round . . . rich countries promised to cut
agricultural subsidies. Since then, they have
increased them. They now spend just over $1
billion a year on aid to agriculture in poor countries,
and just under $1 billion a day subsidizing
overproduction at home—a less appropriate
ordering of priorities is difficult to imagine.250

budgetary outlay nor the subsidized exports exceeded 3% or 1.7% of the base
period quantities, respectively. See id.
245
See FAO, THE STATE OF FOOD AND AGRICULTURE: AGRICULTURAL
TRADE AND POVERTY: CAN TRADE WORK FOR THE POOR? 27 (2005).
246
Id. at 26–27.
247
See generally UNDP, supra note 126, at 131–135 (explaining the
argument related to the broader discontent that WTO rules deny developing
countries the right to do what industrialized nations have done while they
were developing, stifle competition, and ensure that developed counties
continue to get benefits, while developing countries reinforce the disparity).
248
FAO, supra note 245, at 24–28.
249
See Editorial, A Disgraceful Farm Bill, N.Y. TIMES, May 16, 2008,
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/05/16/opinion/16fri3.html?_r=0.
250
UNDP, supra note 123, at 10.
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For example, in the early 2000s a dairy cow in the EU received a
daily subsidy greater than the per capita daily income of around half
of the world’s population.251 Through such heavy-handed subsidies,
rich nations not only deprive their poor counterparts of export
earnings that they desperately need, but they also compound the
misery of producers in poor countries by driving them out of their
own markets.252 It has been found that some agricultural subsidies
provided by the rich countries are inconsistent with the AoA.253
Brazil successfully challenged the U.S. cotton subsidy before the
WTO Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) in the US-Upland Cotton
case.254 The panel found that the U.S. had provided several forms of
prohibited subsidies worth billions of dollars.255 The panel’s finding
was upheld by the appellate body, with only slight modification, and
was subsequently adopted by the DSB.256 However, the U.S. refused
to comply with the DSB recommendations to withdraw subsidies that
had been found inconsistent with its WTO obligations.257 Brazil
subsequently secured authorization to retaliate before the disputing
parties agreed on a framework for working out solutions to the
dispute.258 The long-awaited U.S. Agricultural Act, signed into law
in February of 2014, eliminated direct support to farmers. 259
However, the Act also introduced several new programs that protect
251

Special Rapporteur on the Right to Food, supra note 120, ¶ 16.
See Nsongurua J. Udombana, A Question of Justice: The WTO,
Africa, and Countermeasures for Breaches of International Trade
Obligations, 38 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 1153, 1173 (2005).
253
See LIZ STUART, OXFAM INT’L, TRUTH OR CONSEQUENCES: WHY THE
EU AND THE USA MUST REFORM THEIR SUBSIDIES OR PAY THE PRICE 1–6
(2005).
254
Panel Report, United States—Subsidies on Upland Cotton (USUpland Cotton), WT/DS267/R (Sep. 8, 2004); Appellate Body Report,
United States-Subsidies on Upland Cotton, WT/DS267/AB/R (Mar. 3, 2005).
255
Panel Report, United States—Subsidies on Upland Cotton (USUpland Cotton), WT/DS267/R, ¶¶ 7.875–948, 8.1.
256
Appellate Body Report, United States-Subsidies on Upland Cotton,
WT/DS267/AB/R, ¶ 8.1.
257
See Arbitration Report, United States – Subsidies on Upland Cotton,
WT/DS267/ARB/1, WT/DS267/ARB/2, WT/DS267/ARB/2/Corr.1 (Aug. 8,
2009).
258
For a short summary and status of the case, see WTO, US—UPLAND
COTTON, https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/
cases_e/1pagesum_e/ds267sum_e.pdf.
259
RANDY SCHNEPF, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R43817, 2014 FARM BILL
PROVISIONS AND WTO COMPLIANCE 6, 10 (2014).
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farmers and cotton producers against price and yield losses.260 Since
these programs fall under the trade distorting amber box payments,
cotton seems far from a settled issue.261 Clearly, Brazil remains
unimpressed.262
Although (unlike Brazil) they are not expected to challenge
prohibited subsidies before the DSB, the so-called C4 countries in
West Africa—Benin, Burkina Faso, Chad, and Mali—that produce
cotton at half the cost of the U.S., strongly campaigned against the
U.S. cotton subsidy.263 They claimed to have sustained severe losses
in export earnings (estimated at 1%–3% of their GDP) due to the U.S.
cotton subsidy.264 Such a heavy subsidy highlights the travesty in aid
to poor nations. In 2001, for instance, Mali received $37 million in
aid.265 However, the country claims to have lost $43 million in
export revenue because of cotton subsidies in rich countries alone.266
Besides, the amount of subsidies in the developed world defies
economic sense. Between 1999 and 2003, for example, U.S. cotton
producers received a $13.1 billion subsidy for a crop estimated at
$13.94 billion. 267 Under such circumstances, it is obvious that
subsistence cotton farmers in poor countries, who cannot rely on their
260

Id. at 14–18.
See id. at 11–20.
262
See Steve Baragona, Brazil Says US Farm Bill Violates Trade Rules,
THE
VOICE
OF
AMERICA
(Feb.
20,
2014,
7:55
PM),
http://www.voanews.com/content/brazil-says-us-farm-bill-violates-traderules-/1856057.html.
263
Michael J. Shumaker, Tearing the Fabric of the World Trade
Organization: United States - Subsidies on Upland Cotton, 32 N.C.J. INT'L L.
& COM. REG. 550 (2007) (showing that the Cotton Four (C4) countries,
supported by non-governmental organizations, such as Oxfam, have been
vocal against the U.S. cotton subsidies, particularly since Cancún,
demanding the elimination of cotton subsidies).
264
UNDP, supra note 123, at 131; see generally Vance E. Hendrix, The
Farm Bill of 2002, The WTO, and Poor African Farmers: Can They CoExist? 12 TULSA J. COMP. & INT'L L. 227 (2004) (identifying severe losses in
export earnings).
265
Blaise Compaore, President, Burkina Faso, Address on Cotton
Submission to WTO Trade Negotiations Committee (June 11, 2003),
available at
http://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news03_e/tnc_10june03_e.htm.
266
Id.
267
Stephen J. Powell & Andrew Schmitz, The Cotton and Sugar
Subsidies Decision: WTO’s Dispute Settlement System Rebalances the
Agreement on Agriculture, 10 DRAKE J. AGRIC. L. 288, 289 (2006).
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governments for any support, do not stand a chance. A World Bank
study shows that half of the cost from cotton trade distortion to SubSaharan Africa is largely attributed to U.S. cotton policies, with only
a quarter of the cost due to policies of developing countries, and the
remainder resulting from EU policies.268 Such a massive subsidy can
suppress prices, shattering the livelihoods of poor farmers in poor
countries. However, poor countries hardly challenge rich countries’
subsidies before the DSB, mainly because the ultimate outcome
depends on the power to retaliate, something which most of them
lack terribly.269 Likewise, some of the EU’s agricultural subsidies
were found to be in violation of the AoA.270
The goal of export subsidies is to distort international trade.
Thus, export subsidies are a direct antithesis of the theory of free
trade and comparative advantage, which is the main reason why it
was outlawed as far back as 1955 for industrial products in which
rich nations have a comparative advantage.271 When it comes to
agriculture (the only sector many poor nations stand a chance in
global trade competition) export subsidies continue to distort trade.272
To be sure, there has been some reduction of export subsidies in
recent years, but that is due to rising market prices and other practical
reasons associated with budget cuts in rich countries rather than the
effectiveness of the AoA.273 Of all protectionist tools, export subsidy,
which is the most trade distorting form of support, puts poor
268

See Kym Anderson & Ernesto Valenzuela, The World Trade
Organization's Doha Cotton Initiative: A Tale of Two Issues 8–10 (World
Bank, Policy Research Working Paper No. 3918, 2006).
269
See generally Luke Olson, Incentivizing Access to the WTO’s
Dispute System for the Least Developed Countries: Legal Flaws in Brazil’s
Upland Cotton Decision, 23 MINN. J. INT’L LAW 125 (2014) (explaining that
substantive justice at the WTO seems to be a luxury that only the rich can
afford; therefore, the least developed nations rarely resort to the WTO’s
DSB).
270
See Appellate Body Report, European Communities-Export
Subsidies on Sugar, WT/DS266/36 (Sept. 6, 2006); UNDP, supra note 123,
at 130.
271
WTO, WORLD TRADE REPORT 2006, at 189–90 (2006).
272
Id.
273
See generally Lilian Ruiz & Harry de Gorter, The Impacts of Export
Subsidy Reduction Commitments in the Agreement on Agriculture, 3
(conference paper, Am. Agric. Econ. Ass’n Annual Meeting, July 30-Aug. 2)
(2000), available at http://purl.umn.edu/21844 (giving an overview of export
subsidy commitments in the AoA).
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countries at a harsh disadvantage.274 Simply put, existing subsidy
levels make a mockery of the overriding objective of the AoA.
4.

DOMESTIC SUPPORT

The SCM Agreement classifies subsidies by boxes that
reflect traffic light colors: green (permitted), amber (to be reduced),
and red (prohibited).275 Unsurprisingly, agriculture does not conform
to the traffic light metaphor of the SCM.276 The AoA deviates from
the “traffic rule” approach in two respects. First, the AoA has no red
box per se—subsidies that are trade distorting and thus are prohibited
under the SCM agreement are tolerated in agriculture.277 Instead, the
AoA aims for gradual reduction of trade distorting subsidies. 278
Accordingly, domestic support exceeding ‘amber box’ commitment
levels is prohibited.279 Second, the AoA introduces a ‘blue box’ for
subsidies that are tied to programs that limit production.280
Amber Box: Article 6 of the AoA sets out commitments to
reduce domestic support.281 Amber box support has a direct link to
prices and production. 282 Hence, commitments are expressed in
terms of the total Aggregate Measure of Support (AMS), calculated
on a product-specific basis in accordance with Annexes 3 and 4.283
Although Amber Box support is the most trade-distorting domestic
support, all members are allowed to provide support up to a de
274

See Trade Reforms and Food Security: Conceptualizing the
Linkages, FOOD & AGRIC. ORG. 42 (2003). With regard to market access,
poor countries can do what rich countries can, i.e., erect trade barriers. Id. at
94. However, because they are poor, they cannot subsidize their agricultural
sectors like rich countries do. Id.
275
Domestic support: Amber, Blue and Green Boxes, WTO,
https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/agric_e/negs_bkgrnd13_boxes_e.htm
(last updated Dec. 1, 2004).
276
See id.
277
See Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, supra
note 236, art. 3.1 (explaining that agriculture is the only exception to the rule
prohibiting subsidies that fall under the Red Box).
278
MATTHIAS HERDEGEN, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC
LAW 252 (2014).
279
See AoA, supra note 56, art. 6.3.
280
See WTO, WORLD TRADE REPORT 2006, supra note 271, at 193–94.
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See AoA, supra note 56, art. 6.2.
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283
Id. art. 6.1.
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minimis threshold. 284 All member states may provide annual
product-specific domestic support, not exceeding 5% of the value of
their total annual basic agricultural production. In addition, they may
provide a non-product specific support (e.g. on fertilizer) of up to 5%
of the value of their total agricultural production.285 For developing
countries, the de minimis threshold is 10% in both cases.286 The
amount of subsidy depends on the value of a country’s annual
aggregate production, which means that countries that possess
efficient techniques of production have a superior advantage over
those that suffer from the perennial problem of production
inefficiency.287 In terms of reduction, developed nations have agreed
to cut their support by 20% over six years starting in 1995. 288
Developing countries must cut by 13% over ten years, while least
developed countries are again exempt. 289 In theory, this appears
favorable to developing countries. In reality, however, it is a
different story, as these percentages (like all other reduction
commitments) are calculated based on the base period total AMS.290
Thus, while a 20% cut in rich countries still leaves a massive amount
to farm support, 291 most developing countries did not maintain
significant agricultural support during the base period.292 Even now,
most developing countries are unable to provide support even at the
permitted de minimis level.293 Poor countries regard agriculture as a
source of tax revenue, not as a sector they ought to support.

284

Id. art. 6.3.
Id. art. 6.4.
286
See id.
287
Id.
288
Agriculture: Fairer Markets for Farmers, WTO,
https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/agrm3_e.htm (last
visited June 14 2015).
289
Id.
290
AoA, supra note 56, art. 6.2.
291
FAO, THE RIGHT TO FOOD GUIDELINES: INFORMATION PAPERS AND
CASE STUDIES 60 (2006). Around 90% of farm subsidies are provided by
developed nations. Id.
292
See BOHMAN ET AL., supra note 78, at 5. Thus, developed nations
can provide an annual support up to 5% of the total value of agricultural
product, and studies show some even maintain an amber support far beyond
the permissible threshold. Id. at 19.
293
Id. at 19.
285
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The AoA prohibits countries from introducing new types of
domestic support. 294 Again, this puts developing countries at a
disadvantage. By the base period, developed countries already had
various forms of support in place. By contrast, most developing
countries did not have meaningful support programs, and now they
cannot introduce new ones.295 Note that the AMS is calculated in
exclusion of the de minimis level of support, production-limiting
agricultural support, as well as support under the long list of
permissible programs deemed to be nontrade distorting or only
minimally distorting.296 Hence, AMS does not reflect all government
transfers to farmers.297 While average AMS has declined since the
base period, overall agricultural support remains significantly
higher.298 In monetary terms, overall government transfer to farmers
in OECD countries was even higher in 2003 than it was in 1986–
1988.299 The laxity of the AoA can be gleaned from the fact that
actual amber box support, even in rich nations, is lower than the
permissible threshold.
Green Box: Agricultural supports under this category are
deemed to have no or minimal trade distorting effect; hence, they are

294

Id. at 5.
See Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Right to Food, Mission
to the World Trade Org., ¶ 13, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/10/5/Add.2 (Feb. 4, 2009).
296
See AoA, supra note 56, at Annex 3 (noting that the AMS only
covers support under the amber box that are above the de minimis threshold,
and does not cover support programs falling under the blue box or green box
category).
297
FAO, supra note 245, at 30.
298
See OECD, AGRICULTURAL POLICES IN OECD COUNTRIES: AT A
GLANCE 29 (2010).
299
Agricultural support in OECD countries has fallen from 37% of the
gross value of farm recipients in 1986–1988 base period to about 30% in
2003–2005. PETER DICKEN, GLOBAL SHIFT: MAPPING THE CHANGING
CONTOURS OF THE WORLD ECONOMY 271 (6th ed. 2010). However, the
actual amount of annual support has increased from $242 billion to $273
billion over the same period (over 90% of this amount is provided by the
EU). Id. at 288. Even when agricultural support fell to “historic lows” as a
result of high commodity prices and compellingly tight budgets particularly
in Europe, OECD countries provided $227 billion in 2010. See Agriculture:
Support to agriculture at historic lows, OECD says, OECD (Sept. 9, 2011),
http://www.oecd.org/document/48/0,3746,en_2649_37401_48714608_1_1_1
_37401,00.html.
295
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permitted.300 However, many believe that Green Box subsidies do
actually distort trade.301 The long list of programs that governments
may legitimately employ to support their agricultural sectors under
Annex 2 include rural development aids, agricultural research outlays,
disease control, infrastructure, insurance and food security, and even
“decoupled” direct payments to farmers, among others.302 The Green
Box is essentially the compromise between the desire to reduce
agricultural trade distortions and the almost intuitive apprehension of
true liberalization.303 Currently, there is no limit on the amount of
subsidies the government may provide under this category.304 As a
result, the trajectory of Green Box support has been rising in many
instances since the AoA came into force. In the U.S., for instance,
government payments in this category have soared from $46.1 billion
in 1995 up to $125.1 billion in 2011.305 In 1999-2000, the U.S. spent
$1.3 billion on rice subsidies when the total rice production was just
$1.2 billion. 306 Meanwhile, Japan spends more money on

300
Arvind Panagariya, Liberalizing Agriculture, FOREIGN AFFAIRS,
http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/61217/arvind-panagariya/liberalizingagriculture (last visited June 14, 2015). Clearly, not all of those programs
are nontrade distorting, and how minimal their distorting effect has also been
controversial. See generally World Trade Organization, Ministerial
Declaration of 18 December 2005, WT/MIN(05)/DEC (2005).
301
See WTO, WTO AGRICULTURE NEGOTIATIONS: THE ISSUES, AND
WHERE WE ARE NOW 55 (Dec 1, 2004).
302
See AoA, supra note 56, at Annex 2. See also FAO, supra note 245,
at 32. As long as it is not related to current production, governments may
make direct payment to their farmers; they are thus deemed to have no
impact on farmers’ wealth or risk assessment in their agricultural investment
decisions, although this remains controversial. Id.
303
Cody A. Thacker, Agricultural Trade Liberalization in the Doha
Round: The Search for a Modalities Draft, 33 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 721,
745 (2005).
304
Id.
305
See Government Payments & the Farm Sector, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF
AGRIC.,
http://www.ers.usda.gov/topics/farm-economy/farm-commoditypolicy/government-payments-the-farm-sector.aspx#.U6RBiPldW8A
(last
updated Apr. 1, 2014).
306
Devinder Sharma, Zero Tolerance for Farm Subsidies, INDIA
TOGETHER (Feb. 1, 2003), http://indiatogether.org/zerotolr-op-ed.
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agricultural support than the overall value of its agricultural
production.307
Blue Box: This is another permitted support measure that
may involve direct payments. Blue Box supports are essentially
Amber Box subsidies coupled with a condition that the recipient
farmers limit trade-distorting production.308 Direct payment under
the Blue Box may be provided based on fixed areas and yields, on
85% or less of the base level of production, and based on livestock
numbers.309 The ostensible rationale for introducing a new Blue Box
in agriculture was to assist countries to reform their farm sectors.310
It was particularly suited for the EU, where market support payments
have historically either caused overproduction or were found to be
inefficient. 311 Both Green Box and Blue Box subsidies are
susceptible to abuse. For instance, OECD countries are accused of
manipulating these categories to reshuffle support programs that
would have normally fallen under the Amber Box.312 As a result,
while most of these nations may have met their AMS reduction
commitments, the overall level of support remains unchanged since
the Uruguay Round.313 Besides, there is no restriction on export of
products that benefit from support under these two boxes.314 Because
most developing countries lack the requisite resources to maintain
these support programs, it is obvious that these exceptions mainly
benefit rich nations.
In general, the AoA has laid out the framework to establish
a “fair and market-oriented” trading structure, which is the overriding
goal of the agreement.315 However, actual trade commitments under
the AoA are unsatisfactory. It has not effectively addressed
307

Devinder Sharma, Protecting Agriculture: “Zero-Tolerance” on
Farm Subsidies, INST. FOR POL’Y STUD. (Feb. 5, 2003), http://www.ipsdc.org/protecting_agriculture_zero-tolerance_on_farm_subsidies/.
308
Domestic support, WTO,
https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/agric_e/ag_intro03_domestic_e.htm
(last visited June 14, 2015).
309
See AoA, supra note 56, at art. 6.5.
310
Agriculture: Fairer Markets for Farmers, supra note 288.
311
Id.
312
See id.
313
UNDP, supra note 123, at 129.
314
DE SCHUTTER & STIFTUNG supra note 229, at 13.
315
VICTOR MOSOTI & AMBRA GOBENA, INTERNATIONAL TRADE RULE
AND THE AGRICULTURE SECTOR: SELECTED IMPLEMENTATION ISSUES 40–41
(2007).
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outstanding issues in agriculture dealing with market access, export
competition, or domestic support.316 Substantively, agricultural trade
remains as unfair and almost as distorted as ever.317 Both developed
and developing nations are responsible for high tariff-induced
distortions.318 In rich countries, high tariffs are reinforced by an
array of support programs, ensuring that their markets are almost
impenetrable. 319
The level of agricultural protectionism in
industrialized countries “fl[ies] in the face of the rhetoric” about free
trade and comparative advantage.320 If a deal negotiated mainly by
rich countries was expected to address the development needs of
poorer countries and thereby boost their ability to tackle poverty and
deprivation, it has clearly failed to do so.321 Yet, agriculture is an
unfinished business. The Doha Development Agenda (DDA)
presents another opportunity to meaningfully address the
development needs of the poor and improve the credibility of the
system.322
C. DOHA ROUND NEGOTIATIONS ON AGRICULTURE
The Havana Charter envisioned an international trade
organization that would comprehensively deal with trade and

316

José Maria Garcia Alvarz-Coque, The Mediterranean and the WTO,
in AGRI.MED: AGRICULTURE, FISHERIES, FOOD AND SUSTAINABLE RURAL
DEVELOPMENT IN THE MEDITERRANEAN REGION 32–33 (2006).
317
INFO. & EXTERNAL REL. DIVISION, WTO, UNDERSTANDING THE WTO
51 (5th ed. 2005) [hereinafter INFO. & EXTERNAL REL. DIVISION]. Some rich
WTO members are also accused of deliberately overestimating the level of
protectionism during the base period (1986–1988) to ensure that the level of
protectionism at the end of the implementation period remains steady. See
Messerlin, supra note 13, at 4.
318
INFO. & EXTERNAL REL. DIVISION, supra note 317, at 98.
319
See Messerlin, supra note 13, at 5–6.
320
Alessndro Antimiani & Luca Salvatici, EU Trade Policies:
Benchmarking Protection in a General Equilibrium Framework, 26
(TRADEAG, Working Paper May 4, 2005).
321
U.N. DEP’T ECON. & SOC. AFFAIRS, ACHIEVING SUSTAINABLE
DEVELOPMENT AND PROMOTING DEVELOPMENT COOPERATION: DIOLAGUES AT
THE ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COUNCIL 154–156, U.N. Sales No. E.08.II.A.11
(2008).
322
See generally NAT’L FOREIGN TRADE COUNCIL, THE DOHA DEVELOPMENT
AGENDA, TURNING VISION INTO REALITY 1–2 (2005).
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development issues within the UN framework.323 At about the same
time the ITO Charter was being negotiated, a related, albeit less
ambitious negotiation resulted in one of the most remarkable
agreements—the GATT.324 Although the ITO was meant to serve as
an umbrella institution that would administer the GATT, the latter
had entered into force before the Havana Conference by virtue of the
Protocol of Provisional Application (PPA).325 Despite its humble
beginning, the GATT would prove to be an outstanding agreement
and de facto institution until it eventually evolved into the WTO in
1995. 326 By contrast, the failure of the ITO project meant that
development and social issues would remain on the fringes of trade
negotiations for decades.327 Expansion of trade had practically been
the sole goal of trade rounds during the GATT era.328 The DDA
promises a break from that mercantilist tradition. For the first time,
323

In its very first meeting on February 18, 1946, the United Nations
Economic and Social Council adopted a resolution calling for an
international conference on trade and employment. See Econ. & Soc.
Council Res. 13, Resolutions Adopted by the Econ. & Soc. Council, 3rd
Sess., Sept. 11–Dec.10, 1946, U.N. Doc. E/245/Rev.1, (1946). A series of
negotiations took place until their culmination in 1948 by the adoption of the
ITO Charter in Havana, Cuba. See generally Havana Charter, supra note 48.
Being the final act of the U.N. Conference on Trade and Employment, the
Havana Charter contains chapters devoted to development and employment
issues. See generally id.
324
CRAIG VANGRASSTEK, WTO, THE HISTORY AND FUTURE OF THE
WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION 44 (2013).
325
Petros C. Mavroidis, Trade in Goods: The GATT and Other
Agreements Regulating Trade in Goods, 8 WORLD TRADE REV. 472, 472–74
(2007).
326
Susan Ariel Aaronson, From GATTO to WTO: The Evolution of an
Obsure Agency to one Percieved as Obstructing Democracy, EH.NET
ENCYCOPEDIA OF ECONOMIC AND BUSINESS HISTORY (April 1, 2015, 4:38
PM), http://eh.net/encyclopedia/from-gatt-to-wto-the-evolution-of-anobscure-agency-to-one-perceived-as-obstructing-democracy-2/.
327
Id.
328
The GATT Years: from Havana to Marrakesh, WTO,
https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/
tif_e/fact4_e.htm (last visited June 14, 2015). The previous eight GATT
trade negotiation rounds dealt almost exclusively with the reduction or
elimination of trade barriers. Id. Those rounds, usually named after the city
where the negotiations were launched, are, chronologically: Geneva (1947);
Annecy (1949); Torquay (1950); Geneva (1956); Dillon (1960–1961);
Kennedy (1962–1967); Tokyo (1973–1979); and the Uruguay Round, the
most remarkable and the final round under the GATT (1986–1994). Id.
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trade came to be viewed not as an end itself, but as a means to foster
development and prosperity for all.329 With a view towards ensuring
that “all . . . peoples . . . benefit from the increased opportunities and
welfare gains that the multilateral trading system generates,” member
states declared their commitment to place the development needs of
developing countries at the heart of the WTO’s work.330 Since no
sector has greater significance to the development needs of the poor,
liberalizing agricultural trade figures prominently in the first
developed round in the history of the multilateral trading regime.331
The avowed emphasis on the development needs and interests of
developing nations seems to have bred high expectations in the
developing world.332 The expectation, however, is in stark contrast
with what developed nations are willing to concede.
The
development idealism of Doha seems to have evaporated by the heat
of mercantilist realism.333
The Doha Round was set to be concluded by January 1,
2005.334 Over a decade from that deadline, a deal on modalities
framework has yet to be struck. Successive attempts to salvage the
Round have so far ended in failure.335 The Bali Agreement is the
only exception in this regard, although the deal is only a miniscule
329

Vinaye Ancharaz, Can the Doha Round be Saved?, in THE FUTURE
CHALLENGES – A COLLECTION OF SHORT

AND THE WTO: CONFRONTING THE
ESSAYS 102, 103–04 (2012).
330

Doha Declaration, supra note 39, ¶ 2.
Most developing countries have no greater need or interest than an
improved market access for their agricultural products. Thus, the DDR was
launched with the aim of, inter alea, improving market access; reducing
(with a view to phasing out) all forms of export subsidies; and substantial
reduction of trade-distorting domestic support in agriculture. Josef
Schmidhuber & Seth Meyer, How Has the Treadmill Changed Direction?
WTO Negotiations in the Light of a Potential New Global Agricultural
Market Environment, in TACKLING AGRICULTURE IN THE POST-BALI CONTEXT
33 (Ricardo Melendez-Ortiz ed., 2014). In return, rich countries sought
greater market access particularly in the areas of services and investment.
See Doha Declaration, supra note 39, ¶¶ 2, 13–15.
332
See Doha Declaration, supra note 39, ¶¶ 2, 13–15.
333
As WTO members “succumbed so completely to the pursuit of their
commercial self-interest[,] . . . Doha Round has . . . lost nearly all links to its
original purpose-trade liberalization to spur development . . .” Raj Bhala,
Resurrecting the Doha Round: Devilish Details, Grand Themes, and China
Too, 45 TEX. INT'L L. J. 1, 4 (2009).
334
See Doha Declaration, supra note 39, ¶ 45.
335
Ancharaz, supra note 329, at 104–05.
331
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portion of the DDA.336 In view of this fact, and the apparent shift of
focus to regional and transcontinental trade alliances, the fate of the
DDA seems increasingly uncertain.337 Disagreements on agriculture
epitomize the rather cheerless history of Doha negotiations.338 A
deal on a modalities framework was set to be struck at the Cancún
Ministerial Conference in 2003, but resulted in failure.339 The failure
was attributed primarily to the EU’s refusal to reform the CAP and
the U.S.’s unwillingness to cut farm subsidies.340 In the summer of
2004, negotiators agreed on the so-called July 2004 package. 341
Aside from a few specifics, such as placing a cap on Blue Box
subsidies, the July 2004 package was limited to broad outlines.342
The Hong Kong Ministerial Conference tried to address
some of the most outstanding issues in agriculture.343 Member states
agreed to eliminate all forms of export subsidies in agriculture by the

336
“The Bali package is only distantly related to the heart of the 2001
agenda.” Richard Baldwin, APEC-like Duties for a Post-Bali WTO, in
BUILDING ON BALI, supra note 6, at 43.
337
Juegen Matthes, Reform of the WTO and the International Trading
System: Which Place for the EU?, in THE FUTURE OF THE EU TRADE POLICY
52, 63 (2011). In addition to the existing regional trade alliances, several
transcontinental trade agreements are being negotiated among different
groups of countries. THE TIPP: THE TRANSATLANTIC TRADE AND
INVESTMENT PARTNERSHIP BETWEEN THE EUROPEAN UNION AND THE UNITED
STATES 24–27 (Joaquin Roy & Roberto Dominguez eds., 2014).
338
Susan C. Schwab, After Doha, Why Negotiations Are Doomed and
What We Should Do About It, FOREIGN AFFAIRS (June 2011),
http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/67719/susan-c-schwab/after-doha.
339
Doha Declaration, supra note 39, at ¶3. Modalities are “the
blueprints for the final deal” outlining the formulas and approaches on how
to cut tariffs, reduce subsidies and support, and deal with other issues—
cutting cotton subsidy by 50%—once modalities are agreed, a WTO member
would apply the appropriate formula to compute the scale of quantitative
reductions on the product concerned. See Briefing Report, Agriculture:
Negotiating Modalitites, WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION (last visited June 14,
2015), http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dda_e/status_e/agric_e.htm.
340
See Cho, supra note 5, at 578; Messerlin, supra note 13, at 4.
341
See WTO, Decision Adopted by the General Council on 1 August
2004, 7–8, WT/L/579 (2004).
342
The agreement is to limit blue box support to 5% of the overall value
of agricultural production of a member. Id. at A-1.
343
See WTO, Doha Work Programme Ministerial Declaration of 18
December 2005, 6–12, WT/MIN(05)/DEC (2005).
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end of 2013.344 They also declared to discipline in-kind international
food aid so as to ensure that it would not be used as a form of indirect
export subsidy or to simply dispose surplus production.345 Certain
principles in favor of developing countries were also agreed upon.346
However, trade ministers could not agree on modalities for both
agricultural and non-agricultural market access (NAMA).347
With no sign of a breakthrough, negotiators gathered in
Geneva in the summer of 2008 hoping to forge a deal on
modalities. 348 Once again they could not narrow down their
differences on key issues. 349 The 2008 draft modalities for
agriculture outlines a tiered formula of reduction of domestic support
and tariffs while seeking to eliminate export subsidies.350 In regards
to the Overall Trade-Distorting Support (OTDS), for example, the
highest tier (e.g., for the Base Level OTDS exceeding $60 billion)
344

Id. at 6, 11.
Simone Heri & Christian Haberli, Can the World Trade
Organization Ensure that Food Aid is Genuine? 44-45 (NCCR Trade Reg,,
Working Paper No. 2009/19). Food aid may have similar effect as other
forms of export subsidy—the West, particularly the U.S., has traditionally
been accused of using aid to dump surplus food in the third world, thereby
killing off local production and creating aid dependency. See JOSLING ET AL.,
supra note 158, at 32–33. In the early 1950s, for example, concessional sales
and donations accounted for around 60 percent of USA’s wheat exports. See
id. Thus, there is a desire to discipline international food aid. See, e.g.,
WTO, Revised Draft Modalities for Agriculture, TN/AG/W/4/Rev. 4 (2008).
346
Id.
347
See Bernard Hoekman & Marcelo Olarreaga, The WTO after
Cancun, 38 INTERECONOMICS 232, 232–234 (2003).
348
Heading to Geneva without even a deal on modalities, negotiators
must have felt a sense of urgency to at least clinch a deal on modalities,
particularly in view of the economic turmoil. Pascal Lamy himself sent an
optimistic signal when he declared, “[we are] within reach of a major step in
our drive to conclude the Round this year . . . .” Trade Negotiations
Committee, Lamy Says Time for Action is Now Amid Economic Threats,
WORLD TRADE ORGANIZAITON (July 21, 2008),
http://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news08_e/meet08_chair_21july08_e.ht
m.
349
On the fourth day of the negotiations, it was declared that despite
intensive negotiations, positions on agriculture, Cotton, market access
formula for developed countries, sensitive products, special products and
SSM as well as NAMA, “remain[ed] too far apart.” Id.
350
RANDY SCHNEPF, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RS22927, WTO Doha
Round: Implicaitons for U.S. Agriculture 10–11 (2014).
345
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requires a 75% or 85% cut.351 This tier concerns the EU.352 Second
tier reduction (e.g., for the Base Level OTDS of $10 billion to $60
billion) would be 66% or 73%.353 The U.S. and Japan fall under this
tier.354 That would bring the U.S. OTDS from the current ceiling of
$48.2 billion down to around $16.4 billion or $13 billion. This may
look like a big scale down, but in reality, that amounts to almost no
cut as the average current OTDS of the U.S. stands at about $14
billion.355 In reciprocity, developing countries had to agree that they
would use the Special Safeguard Mechanism (SSM) only in the event
of an import surge by a volume of 40% or more. 356 In earlier
negotiations, the U.S. conditioned its farm subsidy cuts on tariff
reductions in the EU and the tightening of special protection,
including those designed to safeguard livelihoods in developing
countries.357 This prompted the Indian negotiator to lament, “I’m
willing to negotiate commerce, but subsistence, livelihood, security, I
will not be willing to negotiate.”358 SSM would prove to be one of
the sticking points on which convergence could not be attained, as
July talks collapsed unsurprisngly.
The July draft modalities framework was revised once
again—the fourth time that year—and was circulated in December
2008.359 The latest draft adopts single numbers rather than ranges for
351

In agriculture, OTDS includes Amber Box, Blue Box, and de
minimis supports. See Overall Trade-distorting Domestic Support (OTDS),
WTO Glossary, https://www.wto.org/
english/thewto_e/glossary_e/glossary_e.htm (last visited June 14, 2015).
352
Id.
353
WTO, Revised Draft Modalitites for Agriculture, supra note 345, at
2–3.
354
Id.
355
“Since the introduction of the 2002 Farm Act, farm program
payments have averaged about $14 billion per fiscal year.” Farm and
Commodity Policy: Government Payments and the Farm Sector, USDA
(2007) http://www.ers.usda.gov/briefing/farmpolicy/gov-pay.htm.
356
WTO Mini-Ministerial Evades Collapse, as Lamy Finds ‘Way
Forward’, INT’L CTR. FOR TRADE AND SUSTAINABLE DEV. (July, 26 2008),
http://ictsd.org/i/wto/geneva2008/englishupdates/14493/.
357
Larry Elliot & Ashley Seager, Despair as Five Years of World Trade
Talks Fail, THE GUARDIAN (July 31, 2006),
http://www.guardian.co.uk/eu/story/0,,1811387,00.html.
358
Id.
359
Unofficial Guide to the 6 December 2008 ‘Revised Draft Modalities’,
WTO (Dec. 9, 2008),
https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/agric_e/ag_modals_dec08_e.htm.
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domestic support and tariff reductions.360 It also slightly modifies
provisions on special safeguard, tariff simplification, and flexibilities
for different member states.361 Aside from these minor modifications
the December modalities text is not remarkably different from its
July predecessor.362
1. THE BALI PACKAGE
The 2008 breakdown sank the DDA into a state of paralysis.
As chances of resurrecting the DDA looked bleak, negotiators agreed
in 2011 to work on a smaller package of selected issues. 363
Conceding that it was “unlikely that all elements of the Doha
Development Round could be concluded simultaneously in the near
future,” ministers decided to pick “low hanging fruit.”364 The change
in approach seems to work as trade ministers finally reached a deal at
the ninth WTO Ministerial Conference in Bali, Indonesia, in
December 2013.365 Negotiators, long hankering for success, greeted
the Bali package with a sigh of relief.366 Beyond the euphoria,
however, what is the significance of the Bali deal to the broader
DDA? Concerning agricultural trade liberalization, it is tempting to
say nothing at all. Indeed, the deal on agriculture represents more of
a reversion to protectionism than a leap towards liberalization.
The Bali package is an agreement on three issues: trade
facilitation, agriculture, and development.367 The trade facilitation
leg, which seeks to simplify customs procedures by reducing costs
and enhancing efficiency, is probably the most important
360

Id.
Id.
362
See id.
363
See Day 3: Samoa and Montenegro Join Russia with Membership
Agreed, as Ministers Wrap Up Conference, WTO (Dec. 17, 2011),
https://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news11_e/mn11a_17dec11_e.htm.
364
Id.
365
See Christophe Bellmann, The Bali Agreement: Implications for
Development and the WTO, 5 INT’L DEV. POL’Y 2, 2–3 (2014).
366
“‘For the first time in our history: the WTO has truly delivered,’ said
Director General Roberto Azevêdo.” See Days 3, 4 and 5: Round-the-clock
Consultations Produce ‘Bali Package’, WTO (Dec. 7, 2013),
http://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news13_e/mc9sum_07dec13_e.htm.
367
See World Trade Organization, Ministerial Declaration of 7
December 2013, WT/MIN(13)/38, WT/L/913 (2013) [hereinafter Bali
Ministerial Declaration].
361
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breakthrough achieved in Bali. 368 The agreement on agriculture,
which was a result of negotiations between rich nations and the G-33,
led by India, in turn covers three areas: public stockholding for food
security purposes, tariff-rate quota administration, and export
competition. 369 The decision on public stockholding grants
developing countries an interim immunity from legal challenges even
when their domestic support exceeds the permissible limit.370 While
this may please countries such as India, LCDs have limited resources
to maintain meaningful public stockholding programs. Clearly,
development is the only way to integrate LCDs into the global
economy. Yet, on the issue of development, the Bali package is, as
usual, limited to best endeavor clauses.
There has never been a shortage of political declarations to
assist developing countries. 371 For example, with regard to
improving market access, rich WTO members agreed during the
Hong Kong Ministerial to provide duty-free and quota free market
access “for all products originating from all LCDs by 2008.”372 They
likewise vowed to address the issue of cotton within the agriculture
negotiations.373 However, the Hong Kong Ministerial Declaration
remains an empty promise. Similarly, the Bali Agreement does not
add anything substantive other than recycling broken promises.374
Importantly, with agricultural labor productivity less than 1% of the
level in rich nations, LCDs stand little chance in global agricultural
trade competition without a transfer of agricultural technology, as
mandated by the Doha Declaration.375 However, there has been no
material progress in this regard.
Similarly, the Bali package does not contain a legally
binding agreement on export competition.376 It merely represents a

368

See id.
Id.
370
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declaration to exhibit restraint in using export subsidies. 377
Negotiators, acknowledging “that all forms of export subsidies and
all measures with equivalent effect are a highly trade distorting and
protectionist form of support,” expressed their regret that they were
unable to keep their words on eliminating export subsidies by the end
of 2013 as agreed in the Hong Kong Ministerial Declaration.378 With
past failures in mind, they did not dare to set a timeframe for the
elimination of export subsidy this time.379 Generally, the absence of
any material progress with respect to market access, export
competition, and technology transfer means the Bali deal has little
significance to the development needs of poor countries. Virtually
all outstanding issues of agricultural trade and development in
general remain unaddressed.

D. AGRICULTURE: THE KEY TO WTO’S CREDIBILITY
As years pass by, the skepticism on whether the Doha
Round will ever be completed grows.380 Trade negotiations have
collapsed and deadlines have been missed before, yet the multilateral
trading system has only grown stronger.381 Thus, there is room for
optimism. However, it is also important to recognize that Doha is
radically different from previous rounds for a few fundamental
reasons.382 First, the North-South trade dynamics have shifted in a
more profound way than ever before.383 It is sometimes claimed that
the global South wielded greater collective leverage in the 1970s than
today. Yet while the South has traditionally campaigned for
preferential treatment, actual trade rules have almost always been
377

See id.
Id. ¶ 1.
379
Id. ¶ 13 (agreeing to instead review the issue at the 10th Ministerial in
2015).
380
Bhala, supra note 333, at 9 (“[F]ollowing the July 2008 collapse . . .
only truly optimistic trade souls could keep faith in the resurrection of the
Doha Round.”).
381
See Schwab, supra note 338.
382
There are, of course, other incidental factors, such as the global
economic crisis, making economic recovery the preoccupation of many
governments. Also, a severe economic crisis, attributable mainly to
excessive deregulation, is not a good advertisement upon which to sell the
virtues of the open market.
383
See WILL MARTIN, WORLD BANK, TRADE POLICIES, DEVELOPING
COUNTRIES, AND GLOBALIZATION 13 (2001).
378

222

SOUTH CAROLINA JOURNAL OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW & BUSINESS

[Vol. 11.2

determined by the North.384 The rise of emerging powers is changing
that tradition. 385 Developing countries have never been more
assertive.386 More importantly, Doha is the first development round
in GATT/WTO history.387 While the plea of developing countries
for a pro-development trade structure had always fallen on deaf ears,
the widespread popular discontent and powerful protests in Seattle
and elsewhere against the WTO model of globalization seemed to
finally force the trading regime to change course.388 It is important to
remember that the Doha Round was launched against the backdrop of
a failed attempt to start the Millennium Round of trade negotiations
at the Third Ministerial Conference.389 However, for the WTO to
genuinely embrace development, is almost tantamount to altering its
mercantilist ethos and identity. 390 Historically, the ITO project
collapsed while the GATT thrived because development and social
issues do not sit well with mercantilism.391
However, there is no getting around the longstanding quest
for a pro-development trading system. First, unlike when there was
little scrutiny about the trading regime outside of a few experts in the
field, the WTO is now a household name. People from poor farmers
384
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in Africa and Asia to factory workers in the developed world know
how their interests can be affected by the WTO. Thanks to the
WTO’s own success and the information age that we live in, trade
deals can no longer go unexamined. Crucially, as the WTO’s own
charter declares, trade is not an end in itself; it is a means to a
socioeconomic end.392 The WTO is now being challenged to remain
true to its charter. There is hardly a more legitimate demand. The
question concerns the fundamental tenets of international trade, and
is thus simply not going to go away because WTO members turn to
regional and megaregional trade alliances.
It cannot be emphasized enough that the rationale for free
trade lies not in the accumulation of aggregate wealth, but in the
advancement of human welfare. According to Adam Smith, a
trading system that is sustained by what he calls “powerful
merchants” and “manufacturers”—the counterparts to today’s
corporations—which serve their narrow commercial interests at the
expense of the wider society belongs to mercantilism. 393 Since
mercantilists believe that trade should be harnessed towards wealth
and power aggrandizement, they advocate trade-distorting measures,
such as import barriers and export stimulants.394 By contrast, the
kind of trade advocated by classical political economists has to be
both free and fair, that offers a fair chance for all, big and small.
Equity and fairness are central to the idea of free trade advocated by
Adam Smith.395
As the above analysis has shown, the WTO agricultural
trade remains neither free nor fair. In all material aspects, it embodies
392
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mercantilism. Indeed, fundamental criticisms directed at the WTO
today mirror Adam Smith’s refutation of mercantilism.396 In view of
this, the DDA represents a classic dilemma for WTO members: a
dilemma between continuing the pursuits of self-interest
(mercantilism) and advancing the common good (development). If
the DDA is indeed about development, reforming agricultural trade is
imperative, not just because agriculture has profound significance to
development, but because the sector also remains indefensibly
distorted. The WTO’s own credibility is at stake. Even without
explicit references to the far-reaching goals justifying the WTO’s
institutional existence, the legitimacy of the trading regime (of any
institution) must ultimately be assessed by reference to the results in
human terms.

IV. CONCLUSION
Generally speaking, industrialized nations have a superior
comparative advantage over developing countries in almost every
sector; from trade in industrial products to the so-called new issues
brought into the multilateral trading system during the Uruguay
Round. For many developing countries, agriculture represents the
only area in which they stand a chance in global trade competition.
Thus, even from a mercantilist point of view (i.e., without referring
to the issue of development), developing countries have a strong case
in seeking improved market access for their agricultural products.
Yet, of all the sectors, agricultural trade remains highly protected and
distorted. Unarguably, the prevailing level of protectionism does not
cohere with the idea of a fair and market-oriented agricultural trading
system.
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Agriculture holds the key for the conclusion of Doha
Development Round. Without addressing outstanding issues of
agricultural trade, the round cannot be a development round. But
how can WTO members turn agriculture into a building block of the
round? The choice is both simple and vexing. It is simple because it
is mainly a question of translating declarations that have been made
into concrete agreements. That is, to establish a genuinely free and
fair agricultural trading system. However, non-binding political
declarations should not be mistaken for political will. A free and fair
agricultural trading system does not admit export subsidy, which is
the complete antithesis of such a system. Existing three-digit
agricultural tariff levels do not blend in the idea of free trade. Some
countries’ farm support in the Green Box category alone exceeds the
total GDP of most WTO members, and that is hardly compatible with
free and fair agricultural trade. However, the failure of WTO
negotiations over the last thirteen meetings is proof that the political
will to dismantle all these protectionist tools and create a truly fair
and development oriented trade structure is lacking. It cannot be
emphasized enough that the challenge is formidable. Yet, there is no
other option than to rise up to the challenge; not only because it is
morally imperative, but also because equitable development is crucial
for a peaceful and prosperous world on the promise of which the
WTO was established.
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